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Since the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia 
has been involved in maritime border disputes with its neighbours the Republic of Slovenia, 
the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State of Montenegro. During the past decades 
after gaining independence, the States have tried to solve the disputes with numerous 
negotiations and agreements. Nevertheless, until this day (2020), Croatia and Slovenia have 
failed to solve the dispute in the Bay of Piran/Savudrija, despite an international arbitration 
tribunal granting three-quarters of the bay to Slovenia. The ‘Neum Agreement’, signed in 
1999, between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is still not in force and the matter is even 
more complex since Croatia is building the Peljesac Bridge on what Bosnia claims to be their 
maritime territory. The legal regime at the entrance of the Bay of Kotor and the maritime 
border between the territorial seas of Croatia and Montenegro is also disputed. Currently, the 
legal regime and the provisional maritime boundary is governed by a temporary protocol, 
signed by the governments of the two States under UN observation in 2002. Nevertheless, the 
agreement is only a temporary solution between the two neighbours, and voices are being 
raised that the protocol has outplayed its role. 
 
The thesis examines possible and plausible future solutions to the disputes from the 
perspective of international maritime law. This is done with consideration to relevant 
international treaties, provisions and regulations can provide in the on-going disputes.  
Furthermore, the concept of innocent passage is examined, since the Adriatic Sea constitutes 
an important area for maritime navigation. Maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty is examined, 
due to the presence of natural resources in the Adriatic Sea, which makes the maritime border 
delimitations even more delicate, since it involves aspects of exploration and exploitation of 
the resources in the maritime spaces of mentioned States. The thesis concludes that previous 
unratified treaties have largely been implemented by all States, in line with the principles of 
international maritime law. Nevertheless, permanent solutions must be sought mutually by the 
present and future governments of respective States.  
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1    Introduction 
National borders at sea are determined through the process of maritime delimitation. The 
process of dividing maritime areas between coastal States aims to establish clearly defined 
maritime borders. Furthermore, the process itself is important in order to decide a State’s 
jurisdiction over a specific maritime area.1 
 
The Adriatic Sea is an extended arm of the Mediterranean Sea, situated between the Italian 
and Balkan Peninsulas. It is shared between Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Albania. For centuries, various civilizations, cultures and empires have 
fought over the control of the sea, which hold many natural resources and biodiversity, such 
as fisheries, rich flora and fauna, to name a few. Furthermore, control of the maritime 
navigation in the area has, and still is of high importance as well.2 After the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed into 
several new States. This gave rise to several border disputes between the newly-formed States 
in the Balkans. For the past three decades, the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea has seen no 
less than three maritime border disputes between the Republic of Croatia and its neighbours, 
the Republic of Slovenia, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State of Montenegro.3  
 
In the Gulf of Trieste, at the border between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of 
Croatia, a maritime border dispute is taking place in the Bay of Piran/Savudrija. Slovenia 
claims that the bay should fall under Slovenian sovereignty, whereas Croatia claims that the 
bay should be shared between the two States in two equal parts. An ad hoc Arbitration 
Tribunal was set up to resolve the dispute, which granted three-quarters of the bay to 
Slovenia, and one-quarters to Croatia. Furthermore, Slovenia was granted a maritime junction 
from its territorial waters to the High Seas. However, the junction was granted over Croatian 
territorial waters. Croatia left the Arbitration Tribunal, and has consistently denied and 
disputed the validity of the Tribunal’s Final Award. As of 2020, the legal situation in the Bay 
of Piran/Savudrija de facto remains unsettled.4  
 
Further south, the land territory of Croatia is divided in two parts due to a relatively small 
land stretch of around 20 km, that belongs to its neighbour Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to 
this, road travel from the north of Croatia to the south, must pass through border checks at the 
Croatian/BiH border. Furthermore, the maritime border between the two States is disputed, 
including the sovereignty over two small islets, Veliki and Mali Ston, that are located in the 
                                                
1 Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘The International Law of the Sea’ (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press 2019) 237 
(Henceforth ‘Tanaka’). 
2 Encyclopædia Britannica, ‘Adriatic Sea’ (Britannica Academic, 19 August 2016) <https://academic-eb-
com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/levels/collegiate/article/Adriatic-Sea/3799> accessed 4 September 2020. 
3 Vedran Pavlic, ‘Overview of Croatia’s Border Disputes with BiH, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Liberland’ 
Total Croatia News (Zagreb, 22 January 2017) (Henceforth ‘Pavlic’) <https://www.total-croatia-
news.com/politics/16084-overview-of-croatia-s-border-disputes-with-bij-montenegro-serbia-slovenia-liberland> 
accessed 22 September 2020. 
4 Paul McClean, ’Croatia rejects tribunal ruling in border dispute with Slovenia’, Financial Times (Brussels, 29 
June 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/309147e4-5ce5-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b> accessed 29 October 2020. 
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Channel of Mali Ston.5 Moreover, on the Croatian side the construction of the Peljesac Bridge 
is taking place, which will connect the two parts of Croatia. However, BiH is claiming that 
the bridge is being built over the territorial sea of BiH.6 Since 1999, no bilateral negotiations 
regarding any border settlement have been held between the two neighbours.7 
 
At the very south of Croatia, it shares a short land border of 16 km with its neighbour 
Montenegro. The Prevlaka Peninsula is a part of Croatia. Due to this, the north-western part 
of the entrance of the Bay of Kotor is controlled by Croatia, and the south-eastern part is 
controlled by Montenegro8. The Bay of Kotor is of significant strategic importance for the 
latter, since it holds several ports, cities, touristic venues and almost ten percent of the total 
population of Montenegro. The paradox is that practically all ships passing through the 
entrance of the Bay of Kotor has Montenegro as their first or final destination, yet the 
entrance is, in part, controlled by Croatia.9 Since 2002, a bilateral temporary protocol between 
Croatia and Montenegro has been in force, regarding the status of the Prevlaka Peninsula. 
However, a permanent settlement regarding the maritime border is yet to be reached.10  
 
1.1    Background  
In order to understand why the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea is the place for several 
maritime border disputes, it is important to understand the historical and geopolitical context 
behind the disputes. A summary of each dispute, with a chronological overview of relevant 
events will follow below before the thesis moves over to detailing the legal maritime situation 
in the Adriatic Sea.  
 
1.1.1   Border Dispute with the Republic of Slovenia 
The Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia gained independence on the 25th of 
June 1991. The two newly formed States had both been part of the former Yugoslavia.11 
Despite being two separate republics under the Yugoslav State, the maritime borders between 
them had never been determined during socialist rule. The need for such settlement was 
deemed as non-existent and unnecessary. However, during the summer of 1991, the border 
between Slovenia and Croatia went from being rather abstract, to becoming the State-border 
between two independent and sovereign States. Nevertheless, it quickly became evident that 
                                                
5 Senada Šelo Šabić, Sonja Borić, ‘Crossing over – A perspective on Croatian Open Border Issues’ Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung (Zagreb, November 2016) 5 (Henceforth ‘Šabić, Borić') 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320452031_Crossing_over_A_Perspective_on_Croatian_Open_Bord
er_Issues> accessed 10 October 2020. 
5 Šabić, Borić (n 5) 9. 
6 Mladen Lakic, ’Bosnia to Protest to EU over Croatia Bridge Deal’ BalkanInsight (Sarajevo, 24 April 2018) 
<https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/24/bosnia-calls-eu-commision-over-peljesac-bridge-04-24-2018/> accessed 
29 October 2020.  
7 Šabić, Borić (n 5) 5.  
8 See ’Appendix 5’.  
9 Damir Arnaut, ‘Adriatic Blues’ in Clive H. Schofiled, Seokwoo Lee and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds.) The Limits of 
Maritime Jurisdiction (Koninklijke Brill NV 2014) 155 (Henceforth ‘Arnaut’).  
10 Šabić, Borić (n 5) 9.  
11 Henceforth ’SFRY’.	
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Croatia and Slovenia had opposing views in the matter on how to draw the delimitation line in 
the Bay of Piran/Savudrija, which is located in the most northern part of the Adriatic Sea.12 
 
Furthermore, the two sides have different opinions on the naming of the bay. In the Croatian 
language, the name for the bay is Savudrijska vala (lit. ‘Savudrija Bay’), and is named after a 
small Croatian settlement nearby. In the Slovene language, the term Piranski zaliv is used (lit. 
‘Piran Bay’), and is equally the term mainly used in the English language.13  
 
In 1975, the Osimo Treaty (‘Treaty on the delimitation of the frontier for the part not 
indicated as such in the Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947’) between the SFRY and the 
Republic of Italy was signed, and the two States reached a final agreement on how the border 
in the northern Adriatic Sea would be drawn.14 The treaty came into force in 1977.15 Shortly 
after independence of the two States in 1991, Croatia claimed that the Bay of Piran/Savudrija 
was divided in two equal parts between Croatia and Slovenia, along the Dragonja River, in 
accordance with the principle of equidistance.16 Slovenia, on the other hand, disputed 
Croatia’s position and instead claimed that the Osimo Treaty of 1975 never made any 
reference to the internal borders between the two socialist republics within the SFRY. 
Therefore, the maritime border between the two newly formed States was yet to be 
determined.17 
 
What followed in the coming years after 1991, were several attempts to reach a final solution 
to the maritime border dispute. Both States made overlapping claims over the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija, which came under conflict between the two due to questions regarding 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in the area. Negotiations, diplomatic commissions and expert 
panels were held throughout the 1990s, but with little success in finding a solution for the 
dispute.18 
 
In 2001, Janez Drnovšek and Ivica Račan, the then-Prime Ministers of Slovenia and Croatia 
signed the ‘Treaty between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the 
Common State Border’, commonly referred to as the ‘Drnovšek-Račan Agreement’. The two 
parties agreed that Slovenia would gain around two-thirds, and Croatia one-third of the Bay of 
                                                
12 Matej Avbelj, Jernej Lentar Černič, 'The Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia – The Case of 
Maritime Delimitation' [2007] Journal of International Law & Policy Vol. V, University of Pennsylvania 6:3 
(Henceforth Avbelj, Lentar Černič) <https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-
1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdf> accessed 13 September 2020. 
13 ’Plenković Hopeful Border Dispute with Slovenia Won’t Affect Croatia’s Schengen Bid’ (Total Croatia 
News, 2 November 2019) <https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/39378-schengen> accessed 13 
September 2020. 
14 Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia (2017) PCA, Case No 2012-04, 
Final Award, 29 June 2017 (Henceforth ‘The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award’) 12, para. 44-45. Available at 
<https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/3/>.  
15 Avbelj, Lentar Černič 6:4.  
16 See ’Appendix 1’.  
17 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 13, para. 47.  
18 Ibid 13-15, para. 48-55.  
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Piran/Savudrija.19 Furthermore, the two parties agreed that Slovenia would be granted a 
corridor over Croatian territorial waters, onwards to international waters.20 The Slovenian 
government ratified the agreement, however the Croatian Parliament and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee rejected it and the agreement never came into force.21 
 
The Republic of Slovenia entered the European Union (henceforth ‘EU’) in 2004. The 
Republic of Croatia began its accession negotiations with the European Union in late 2005.22 
Due to the on-going land and border dispute, Slovenia blocked the EU-Croatia negotiations in 
2008, which further deteriorated the bilateral relations of the two neighbours. After 
negotiations between the respective governments, the Slovenian blockade was lifted in July 
2009. The two sides agreed to reach a final settlement regarding the border dispute in an ad 
hoc Arbitration Tribunal. Croatia joined the EU on the 1st July 2013.23   
 
The two parties submitted the arbitration agreement to the United Nations (henceforth ‘UN’), 
on 25 May 2011, with the aim to find a final solution to the land and maritime border 
disputes. Slovenia claimed a maritime corridor over Croatian territorial waters to international 
waters. This due to the fact that a strict equidistance line (which is a practice within 
international maritime law), would only grant Slovenia a small part of the northern Adriatic 
Sea.24  
 
On the 22 July 2015, a major Croatian newspaper, ‘Večernji List’, revealed that the Slovenian 
judge Jernej Sekolec and the Slovenian member of the arbitration panel Simona Drenik had 
put pressure on international members of the tribunal to vote in favour of Slovenia’s claims. 
Due to the accusations, Judge Sekolec and Panel Member Drenik decided to resign from the 
Arbitration Tribunal on the 23 July 2015.25 Croatia’s Prime Minister at the time, Zoran 
Milanović, announced that Croatia would leave the Arbitration Tribunal and would not 
implement the final award. Croatia further sought that the Arbitration Tribunal would be 
suspended and not continue with the proceedings, due to ‘(…) material breaches of the 
                                                
19 Dejan Scepanovic, ’Territorial dispute between Croatia and Slovenia countries’ (Armed Politics, 1 July 2017) 
<https://www.armedpolitics.com/2671/territorial-dispute-croatia-slovenia-continues/> accessed 22 September 
2020. 
20 Treaty Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border (Slovenia-
Croatia) (20 July 2001) article 4(2) (Henceforth ‘Drnovšek-Račan Agreement’), available at 
<http://www.assidmer.net/doc/Drnovsek-Racan_Agreement.pdf> [Unofficial English Version]. 
21 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 27, para. 92 and 96.  
22 ’Croatia – EU-Croatia Relations’ (Europa.eu, 2012) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120102123647/http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm> accessed 23 September 2020. 
23 Pavlic (n 3).  
24 ’Croatia and Slovenia submit arbitration agreement to UN’ (Durham University IBRU, 2011) 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=12176> accessed 25 September 2020. 
25 ’Jernej Sekolec podnio ostavku, ostavku ponudila i Simona Drenik’ (Večernji List, 23 July 2015) 
<https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/slovenski-clan-arbitraznog-suda-podnio-ostavku-1016089> accessed 25 
September 2020.	
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Arbitration Agreement’.26 Slovenia objected Croatia’s claims to terminate the Arbitration 
Tribunal.27 
 
The Tribunal underwent an internal investigation, where it was concluded that Slovenia did 
breach the procedural rules by putting pressure on members of the Panel to vote in their 
favour. However, the Tribunal found that the breach was neither severe nor serious enough to 
a point that it was reasonable to accept Croatia’s claims to terminate the work of the Tribunal. 
Furthermore, due to the resignation of the two Slovene members, the internal investigation of 
the Tribunal found no obstacles in maintaining the independence of the Tribunal.28  
 
On the 29 July 2017, the Arbitration Tribunal disclosed its final award. The decision included 
demarcations and delimitations along the land, river and sea border.29 Slovenia was granted 
three-quarters of the Bay of Piran, and a junction over Croatian territorial waters to 
international waters. Croatia was granted one-quarter of the bay. However, Croatia’s 
government reaffirmed that they would maintain their position from 2015,30 In other words, 
that the Tribunal had no competence to continue its work and that any verdict would be 
regarded as invalid.31 
 
In 2018, Slovenia planned to file a lawsuit to the Court of Justice of the EU (henceforth 
‘CJEU’) against Croatia, for not respecting the verdict of the Arbitration Tribunal. Slovenia 
turned to the European Commission, as according to the procedural rules, the Commission is 
the body which decides if a lawsuit should be settled by the CJEU or not. However, the 
European Commission proclaimed that it would remain neutral in the matter. Instead, the 
Commission ushered the two States to find a joint bilateral solution that would suit both 
sides.32  
 
As of 2020, the maritime border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia is still unsettled, 
despite the fact that the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal has already decided on the matter. 
Croatian Coast Guard still escort Croatian fishermen in the bay, into what Slovenia considers 
to be their maritime area. On the other hand, Slovenian Coast Guard have issued fines to 
Croatian fishermen for alleged violations of Slovenian law. It shall also be noted that Croatia 
aspires to, in a foreseeable future, become a member of the Schengen Area. But as long as the 
                                                
26 Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia (2016) PCA, Partial Award, 30 
June 2016 (Henceforth ‘The Croatia/Slovenia Partial Award’) 17, para. 84. Available at 
<https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1787>.  
27 Ibid 20, para. 86.  
28 Špela Novak, ’Court of Arbitration to define border between Slovenia and Croatia’ RTVSlo (The Hague, 1 
July 2016) <https://www.rtvslo.si/news-in-english/court-of-arbitration-to-define-border-between-slovenia-and-
croatia/397118> accessed 27 September 2020. 
29 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award. 
30 A map over the final award of the disputed area in the Gulf of Piran/Savudrija is to be found in ‘Appendix 3’.  
31 ’Slovenia wins battle with Croatia over high seas access’ (BBC News, 29 June 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40449776> accessed 29 September 2020. 
32 Anja Vladisavljevic, ’EU Stays Out of Croatia-Slovenia Border Dispute’ BalkanInsight (Zagreb, 18 June 
2018) <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/18/ek-remains-neutral-on-croatia-slovenia-border-arbitration-dispute-
06-18-2018/> accessed 30 September 2020. 
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border dispute with Slovenia remains an open question between the two States, Croatia’s 
accession to the Area will not be straight forward.33 
  
1.1.2   Border Dispute with the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Republic of Croatia has a coastal length of approximately 1,777 km. If the 1,246 islands 
are calculated, the total length adds up to approximately 4,058 km.34 Croatia’s neighbour, the 
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth ‘BiH’), has a small coastline of approximately 
24 km.35 The southernmost county of Croatia, the Dubrovnik-Neretva County (Cro. 
‘Dubrovačko-Neretvanska županija’) is divided in two parts, due to the BiH town Neum, 
commonly referred to as the ‘Neum Corridor’.36 Due to this, the southern part of Croatia is an 
exclave, disconnected from the Croatian mainland. Road travel between the two parts of 
Croatia, e.g. between Zagreb (the capital of Croatia) and Dubrovnik (historic and touristic 
destination), must pass through its neighboring country BiH.  
 
The history of the Neum Corridor dates back centuries. In 1699, the Treaty of Karlowitz was 
signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire (commonly referred to as 
‘Austria-Hungary’). The Ottoman Empire was forced to give up conquered areas in Central 
Europe, and withdraw south to the Balkan Peninsula. The historic Republic of Ragusa (later 
renamed ‘Republic of Dubrovnik’ and today a part of Croatia) feared an invasion from the 
Republic of Venice. With the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire to the borders of modern-
day BiH, the Republic of Dubrovnik no longer enjoyed the socio-political safety and 
geographical protection of the Ottoman Empire, since the northern coast of modern-day 
Croatia, was in the hands of Venice. Due to this, the Republic of Dubrovnik ceded the city of 
Neum to the Ottoman Empire, through which it became a part of BiH. Neum and the 
surrounding waters has remained as a part of BiH ever since.37  
 
In 1999, the President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman and the member of the BiH Presidency, 
Alija Izetbegović, negotiated and signed the 'Treaty on the State Border between the Republic 
of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina', (commonly referred to as the 'Neum Agreement').38 
Nevertheless, the respective State parliaments never ratified the treaty. The agreement 
included not only a maritime border delimitation, but also focused on administrative 
solutions, i.e. smoother border-crossings for citizens and companies of the two countries.39  
                                                
33 Peter Müller, ’Why Did EU Commission Chief Go Silent in Border Dispute?’ (Spiegel International, 14 
September 2018) (Henceforth ‘Müller’) <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-commission-chief-
silent-in-slovenia-croatia-dispute-a-1228169.html> accessed 30 September 2020. 
34 The Miroslav Krleža Institute of Lexicography, ‘The Adriatic Sea and Islands’ (Croatia.eu, 2020) 
<http://croatia.eu/index.php?view=article&id=11&lang=2> accessed 13 September 2020. 
35 Ljiljana Krejic, ‘Neum: Bosnia’s Sole Sea Resort’ (Itinari, June 2018) <https://www.itinari.com/neum-bosnia-
s-sole-sea-resort-4p3i> accessed 13 September 2020.  
36 Pavlic (n 3). 
37 ‘Why does Bosnia have a Coast?’ (BigDataBiH, 2018) <https://www.bigdatabih.com/blog/2018/12/24/why-
does-bosnia-have-a-coast/> accessed 30 September 2020. 
38 Mladen Klemencic, ’The Border Agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – The first but not the 
last’ [2000] Boundary & Security Bulletin Durham University IBRU Publications 96 (Henceforth ‘Klemencic’) 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb7-4_klemencic.pdf> accessed 28 September 2020. 
39 Pavlic (n 3).  
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Due to the geographical nature of Croatia, being split in two parts by BiH territory, most 
recently (2018), Croatia begun the building of the Peljesac Bridge (Cro. ‘Pelješki most’). The 
project is largely financed by the EU, and will connect what is now both Croatian and EU 
territory, without the need to pass through BiH (non-EU member). However, the building of 
the bridge has been contested by BiH, claiming that the Croatian side is building the bridge on 
BiH maritime territory.40 The current member of the BiH Presidency, Željko Komšić, 
commented the situation in 2018 as following:  
  
‘Croatia is directly violating Bosnian territorial integrity and sovereignty. (…) 
simply unbelievable that a piece of our country is cut off before our eyes – and that people 
sitting in Bosnian state institutions have done absolutely nothing.’41 
 
Furthermore, BiH currently lacks a harbour, but plans to build one in Neum. The BiH side is 
worried that the bridge will prevent cargo ships from entering Neum, whereas the Croatian 
side claims that the bridge will be 55 m high, and thus will neither prevent, nor obstruct free 
passage of ships with Neum as destination. In addition, the Croatian side claims that the 
bridge will exclusively be built on Croatian maritime territory.42 As of 2020, the building of 
the Peljesac Bridge is on-going, despite objections coming from BiH and is projected to open 
by summer of 2022.43  
 
The two neighbouring States are yet to find a solution on how the maritime border should be 
drawn. The status of the two nearby islets of Veliki and Mali Školj is unclear, since they are 
claimed by both States. The construction of the Peljesac Bridge has brought further 
complications to the bilateral relations, since it remains unclear over which maritime area the 
bridge is being built.  
 
1.1.3   Border Dispute with the State of Montenegro  
The Republic of Croatia and the State of Montenegro share a land-border with a length of 
only 16 km. The Prevlaka Peninsula is Croatia’s most southern tip, close to the border with 
Montenegro.44 The peninsula has historically been a part of the Republic of Ragusa.45 In 
1441, Ragusa built a fortress at Cape Oštra, Prevlaka, at the entrance of the Bay of Kotor 
                                                
40 Anja Vldisavljevic, Danijel Kovacevic, ’Croatia Starts Building Peljesac Bridge Amid Bosniak Fury’ Balkan 
Insight (Banja Luka, Zagreb, 30 July 2018) <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/30/bosnia-and-croatia-in-new-
row-over-peljesac-bridge-07-30-2018/> accessed 14 September 2020.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 ’Latest Photo Update from the Pelješac Bridge Construction’ Croatiaweek (Zagreb, 13 July 2020) 
<https://www.croatiaweek.com/latest-photo-update-from-the-peljesac-bridge-construction/> accessed 14 
September 2020. 
44 Nenad N. Bach, ’Prevlaka back in Croatian Hands?’ Croatia.org (Korfin, 12 October 2002) (Henceforth 
‘Bach’) <http://www.croatia.org/crown/articles/7396/1/E-Prevlaka---Whats-the-deal.html> accessed 14 
September 2020. 
45 See definition of the historic ‘Republic of Ragusa’, which today is a part of Konavle Municipality, Republic of 
Croatia, under section 1.1.2.  
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(BCMS. Boka Kotorska), in order to serve as protection of the citizens of Dubrovnik. Under 
SFRY rule, the peninsula was administered by the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and in its 
proximity, the land-border with the Socialist Republic of Montenegro was drawn just north of 
the peninsula. The fortress at Cape Oštra was a facility of the Yugoslav People's army 
(commonly referred to as 'JNA').46 
 
From 1955 and onwards, the JNA declared that the peninsula would remain off limits for 
civilians, since the army established military installations at Cape Oštra. Thus, the Bay of 
Kotor was well protected from a potential foreign attack. This was of significant importance 
for the JNA and Yugoslavia as a whole, since the bay houses harbours, the airport in Tivat 
and two major cities of Montenegro, Herceg-Novi and Tivat.  
 
Shortly after the declaration of independence in 1991, the war in Croatia broke out. In late 
September, the JNA managed to occupy the peninsula and several towns and villages in 
southern Dalmatia. The JNA also besieged the city of Dubrovnik and its historic Old Town, 
which was declared a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1979.47 A year after, in September 
1992, the Presidents of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Henceforth ‘FRY’) 
managed to resolve the issue, which ended with the withdrawal of FRY forces from the 
peninsula.48 From 1992 until 2002, UN peacekeeping troops controlled the peninsula. Having 
been a demilitarized area, but claimed by both the FRY and Croatia, it was reintegrated under 
the jurisdiction of Croatia in 2002, as it had been under the rule of SFRY.49   
 
The ‘Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)’ was signed on the 10th of December 2002. The agreement clearly 
states that it is only temporary. The aim of the protocol was to normalize the bilateral 
relations and that the dispute would be addressed at one point in the future, in order to reach a 
permanent agreement concerning the delimitation of the sea border. Worth mentioning is that 
there have not been any major incidents between the two States since the signing. 
Nevertheless, the two sides are yet to agree on a permanent settlement.50 
 
1.2    Scope and purpose  
1.2.1    Purpose  
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the border disputes that the Republic of Croatia is 
involved in with its neighbours, the Republic of Slovenia, the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the State of Montenegro. All three disputes date back to the break-up of the 
SFRY. Also, its purpose is to analyse the current legal regime in each dispute in order to be 
                                                
46 Gerald Blake, Dusko Topalovic, ‘The Maritime Boundaries of the Adriatic Sea – Maritime Briefing’ [1996] 
Durham University IBRU Publication Vol. 1 No. 8 46-47 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=231> accessed 17 September 2020. 
47 Ibid 48.  
48 Ibid 45. 
49 Bach (n 44). 
50 Pavlic (n 3). 
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able to present possible and plausible solutions for maritime border delimitations in 
accordance with relevant treaty and case law within the field of international maritime law.  
 
1.2.2    Research questions  
- How should a final maritime border delimitation be drawn in the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija and in the Northern Adriatic? 
- Does Croatia violate the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a maritime State, to 
access the high seas through its construction of the Peljesac Bridge? 
- Should the maritime border between Croatia and Montenegro, in the proximity of the 
Bay of Kotor, be drawn in accordance with the principle of equidistance or the 
principle of equity? 
 
1.2.3    Method and material 
1.2.3.1    Qualitative Analytical Research  
To achieve the purpose of the thesis, the maritime border disputes that the Republic of Croatia 
is involved are in the focus of the study. Two different legal methods are used in order to 
reach the purposes of the thesis. Through the method of qualitative analytical research, the 
aim is to describe and create an understanding for the delicate issues related to each specific 
dispute. Focus is put on historic and present relations between the relevant States, in order to 
objectify why the disputes, with its legal questions, have arisen in the first place and why they 
are yet to be solved. Moreover, the research will be undertaken through the analysis of 
relevant bilateral agreements between the States and interpreting them in the light of 
international maritime treaties.  
 
1.2.3.2   Legal Dogmatic Method  
The legal dogmatic method will be used in order to examine the legal rules and provisions 
within the field of international maritime law. The method can be described as having the aim 
to solve and answer legal questions through applying generally accepted legal sources of 
law.51 The maritime disputes that Croatia is involved in will be put into its legal context. The 
analysis will focus on relevant treaties and well-established principles of international 
maritime law that are in force and binding for the States in question, respectively. 
Furthermore, within the field of international maritime law, other legal sources of interest 
consist of customary international maritime law and answers to the legal questions asked will 
be based on these sources. Lastly, through the method, the aim is to produce relevant and 
possible solutions to the disputes that will uphold the practices already established within the 
legal field. 
 
1.2.3.3   Material 
The on-going maritime border disputes along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea have been 
subject of several previous research papers and articles. However, a majority of the studies 
were written during the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. But due to the 
                                                
51 Jan Kleineman ’Rättsdogmatisk metod’ in Maria Nääv and Mauro Zamboni (2nd edition) Juridisk Metodlära 
(Studentlitteratur AB Lund 2018) 21-22. 
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stand-still in negotiations, the amount of published research in recent years has diminished. 
Information concerning the disputes is largely, but not exclusively, based on academic works 
published in Durham University International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU)52 and major 
international news outlets. As for questions concerning international maritime law and 
maritime border delimitations, the thesis is based on the works of Professors Yoshifumi 
Tanaka, Martin Dixon, Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, among others. Specific 
concepts and principles within the mentioned domain are also based on works published in 
Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law. The thesis also includes remarks made by 
Dr Robin Cleverly from Marbdy Consulting Ltd, legal expert and member of the Slovenian 
team at the PCA Arbitration in the Croatia/Slovenia dispute. 
 
The referencing style used in the thesis is based on the ‘Oxford University Standard for the 
Citation of Legal Authorities’ (OSCOLA, 4th edition). Regarding sources that are referenced 
to in the thesis, the primary focus will lay on sources written in the English Language. 
However, a significant amount of bilateral agreements and research papers that are relevant to 
the thesis are available only in the local languages spoken in South-Eastern Europe (i.e. 
Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian). Due to the authors proficiency in these languages, 
references are also made to non-English sources. 
 
1.2.4    Scope  
The scope of the research is limited to the following border disputes that the Republic of 
Croatia is currently (2020) involved in; (1)Croatia-Slovenia maritime border dispute, 
(2)Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina maritime border dispute and (3)Croatia-Montenegro 
maritime border dispute. All three disputes concern the delimitation of sea borders along the 
eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. The thesis will not analyse the on-going Croatia-Serbia 
border dispute, due to its focus on the border demarcation along the river Danube. Moreover, 
the border disputes on land, between Slovenia and Croatia along the Mura river and between 
BiH and Croatia around Kostajnica (previously ‘Bosanska Kostajnica’) and Hrvatska 
Kostajnica will not be analysed.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis is of legal nature, but the disputes are politically charged due to the 
ever-changing bilateral relations between the States. In the discussion and analysis, comments 
of geopolitical character are briefly made. Nevertheless, the political aspects are not the basis 
for the thesis, but complementary for the general analysis. When it comes to the aspect 
concerning sources of law and their application in each dispute, the thesis is limited to the 
international treaties TSC 1958 and UNCLOS 1982, relevant case law and doctrine within the 
domain of maritime border delimitations. As for the aspects of maritime jurisdiction and 
sovereignty, the thesis only focuses on the legal regimes in territorial and internal waters of 
coastal States. Hence, questions concerning jurisdiction and sovereignty in other maritime 
spaces are excluded.  
 
                                                
52 ’Croatia’, Durham University International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU, 20 February 2013) 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/search/?keywords=Croatia> accessed 24 September 2020.  
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1.2.5    Overview  
The thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the reader is provided with a brief 
and relevant background introduction of the three maritime border disputes that Croatia is 
currently involved in. Furthermore, the purpose, the research questions, method, material and 
scope of the thesis are presented. The second chapter, named ‘The Border Disputes of 
Croatia’, constitute a part of the main body of the thesis, which begins with putting the 
disputes into their historic context, which is needed in order to understand why they have 
arisen in the first place. Thereafter, it turns to presenting thoroughly the main legal issues of 
the three disputes in a chronological order, from the independence of the States until today. 
The third chapter, named ‘Law of the Sea and Maritime Border Delimitations’, explains the 
historic developments of international maritime law and the legal principles it rests upon. 
Special focus is put on providing a basic understanding of the concept of maritime border 
delimitations and how they are made in accordance with relevant treaty and case law. The 
fourth chapter, named ‘A State’s Maritime Jurisdiction and Sovereignty’, focuses on legal 
aspects in the territorial sea of a coastal State and the concept of innocent passage for foreign 
vessels. Lastly, it explains the legal principle ‘Uti Possidetis’. The fifth chapter, named ‘Final 
Solutions to the Disputed Border Delimitations in the Adriatic Sea’, concerns the findings of 
the previous chapters are discussed and analysed. The chapter is divided into three 
subsections, in which the research question is answered by the end of each subsection. The 
first section concerns the dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, and it differs from the second 
and third section, due to the existence of a judgement by the PCA. Hence, the discussion is 
focused on the ‘Final Award’ of the International Arbitration Tribunal, the critique of it and 
Croatia’s unwillingness to accept the outcome. The remaining research questions allow 
discussion and analysis of plausible outcomes of the disputes between BiH/Croatia and 
Montenegro/Croatia, respectively. The sixth, and final chapter of the thesis, named 














2   The Border Disputes of Croatia  
In order to be able to understand the maritime border disputes between the four Ex-Yugoslav 
States that arose after the fall of the latter and to answer the legal research questions, it is 
important to put them in the context of international maritime law. This chapter firstly 
provides a short overview of the history of the Balkans, and then moves over to an analysis of 
each maritime border dispute in the Adriatic Sea, with emphasis on the legal challenges the 
relevant States are currently facing. It is also important to bear in mind that when referring to 
treaty law, all mentioned States are parties to 1982 UNCLOS.  
 
2.1   Historic Overview  
The Balkan peninsula, geographically situated in south-eastern Europe, stretching from 
Greece and Turkey in the south to the Slovene/Italian border in the north, has throughout 
history been a rather unstable region of Europe. Its ethnic diversity and political upheaval 
have resulted in numerous border changes. Various empires have fought for the control over 
the area since the peninsula has been regarded as the gateway between east and west. The 
Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary have, during different times in history, 
ruled over the different ethnic groups in the Balkans. Historically, the peninsula has mainly 
been inhabited by Slavic peoples, more specifically South Slavs. Worth mentioning is that the 
area has been inhabited by smaller numbers of Germans, Hungarians, Ukrainians and 
Italians.53  
 
During the first half of the 20th century, after World War I, a new country emerged in the 
Balkans. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came about through the unification of 
the various ethnic groups coming together and creating a joint State. The different nations 
shared a common language, similar culture and traditions. The State was sporadically called 
by its more known name, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.54 
 
After World War II, communists gained power and the State was renamed “Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia”. The State was a federation of the following socialist federal 
republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. 
Furthermore, the SFRY included two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which 
in turn were a part of the largest republic within the federation, the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia. The communist leader of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito (henceforth “Tito”) gained power 
over the new Yugoslavia and managed to remain in office until his death in 1980. The 
Communist Party of SFRY, with Tito as the president, held a firm grip over the State. 
Nationalistic sentiments of the different ethnic groups within the State were quickly pushed 
                                                
53 Loring Danforth, ’Balkans’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 19 November 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans> accessed 8 September 2020.  
54 John B. Allcock, ‘The First Yugoslavia’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 22 February 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003#ref228361> accessed 8 
September 2020. 
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aside, with the result of many members of oppositional formations being forced to leave the 
SFRY.55  
 
After the death of Tito in 1980, there was no clear successor and the Communist Party of 
SFRY introduced a rotating collective presidency, named the ‘Presidency of Yugoslavia’, 
with each republic being represented by one member. The position as President of the 
Presidency was limited to a term length of one year, after which he or she would be replaced 
by a new president from another republic.56 
 
By the beginning of the end of communism in eastern Europe, starting with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, the wind of change started to blow over the political life of the SFRY. In 
1990, the first multi-party elections were held. In Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, so-called ‘national parties’, with the aim of independence of their respective 
republics gained power. On the 25th of June 1991, the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic 
of Croatia declared their independence from the SFRY. On the 1st of March 1992, the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed the path of Slovenia and Croatia. What 
followed was break-up of SFRY and wars broke out in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.57 
 
The independence war in Slovenia lasted ten days, between the 27th of June and 7th of July 
1991, ending with the signing of the Brioni Declaration between the newly formed Republic 
of Slovenia and the SFRY.58 The independence wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
started on the 31st of March 1991 and on the 6th of March 1992, respectively.59 Both wars 
ended simultaneously through the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on the 14th of 
December 1995, due to the international pressure put on what remained of Yugoslavia 
(renamed the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ and later renamed ‘State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro’).60  
 
                                                
55 Ivo Banac, ‘Josip Broz Tito’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 4 May 2020) 
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Josip-Broz-Tito> accessed 9 September 2020.  
56 John R. Lampe, ‘The Second Yugoslavia’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 22 February 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003#ref228362> accessed 9 
September 2020.  
57 United States Department of State ‘The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990-1992’. (Office of the Historian, Foreign 
Service Institute 2016) <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia> accessed 14 
September 2020. 
58 ‘Slovenia’s Ten-Day War’ (The Slovenia Times, 24 June 2004) 
<https://sloveniatimes.com/slovenia%E2%80%99s-ten-day-war/> accessed 10 September 2020. 
59 ‘Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia’ (BBC News, 22 May 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm> accessed 10 September 2020. 
60 Bill Clinton, ‘Dayton Accords’ (Encyclopædia Britannica, 27 June 2013) 
<https://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords> accessed	14 September 2020. 
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2.2   Bay of Piran  
2.2.1   Slovenia’s claims  
The Slovenian-Croatian maritime border dispute largely takes place in the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija (henceforth referred to by its English name ‘Bay of Piran’). The Republic of 
Slovenia has claimed the Bay of Piran to be fully under Slovenian sovereignty. The Slovene 
side bases its claims on the second paragraph of article 15 of UNCLOS, which was agreed in 
the Drnovšek-Račan Agreement from 2001, signed by the then-prime ministers of the two 
States. Nevertheless, the Croatian Parliament chose not to ratify the agreement. The article 
states, in its first paragraph, that an equidistance line shall be drawn between two States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts, which the two States have. In other words, the line shall be drawn 
from the baselines of the territorial sea61. In that case, the border would be draw in the way 
that both States would equally share the bay. However, even though Slovenia acknowledges 
the equidistance principle to be a commonly accepted rule, it does not consider it to be the 
only principle available for delimitation of maritime borders.62 
 
Instead, Slovenia put forth two claims at the Arbitration Tribunal. Firstly, the Bay of Piran 
was to be considered as a ‘historic bay’. In their view, the Treaty of Osimo from 197563 
(SRFY-Republic of Italy), recognized it as a historic bay and part of the internal waters of 
SFRY. This was based on the official charts of the treaty, which show that the bay was closed 
across the mouth of the bay. Thus, the bay was to be considered as a part of the internal 
waters of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia.64 Slovenia claimed that since the SFRY was a 
signatory party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, the bay was to be considered as internal waters of the former State, through having the 
status of being a historic bay, in accordance with article 7 of the named convention. 
Therefore, Slovenia claimed to have inherited the sovereignty over it.65 
 
Secondly, Slovenia claimed that it had complete jurisdiction, both prior (from 1975) and after 
independence (since 1991), over the bay. This by having economic and police control over the 
bay. In their view, the bay was considered a part of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and 
hence, it should fall under Slovenian sovereignty.66 They based the claim on article 15(2) in 
UNCLOS 1982 which states that the first paragraph of the article (i.e. the application of the 
principle of equidistance) is not applicable if a bay can be considered to be a historic bay.67 
 
                                                
61 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 1 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS (Henceforth ‘UNCLOS’) Article 15(1); Tanaka 256. 
62 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 294, para. 954.  
63 Section 1.1.1, ‘Border Dispute with the Republic of Slovenia’. 
64 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 246, para. 782. 
65 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 245, para. 779. 
66 Ibid 244, para. 774-775. 
67 UNCLOS article 15(2).  
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Furthermore, Slovenia argued that delimitation must be based on the legal principle of ‘uti 
possidetis’.68 The principle is considered to be a well-established principle within 
international law, and roughly translates to ‘as you possess’. Slovenia claimed that the bay 
constituted internal waters of SFRY and the Socialist Republic of Slovenia prior to the break-
up of the country.69 In their view, Slovenia had always had the de jure possession and control 
over the bay, both prior and after independence. However, due to Croatia’s contesting, de 
facto right to and over the bay remained obscure.  
 
Regarding the Slovenian junction to the high seas over Croatian territorial waters, the 
Slovenian side put forth claims that a State has the right to a corridor that would link their 
territorial sea to the high seas. According to Slovenia, the sole principle ‘right of innocent 
passage’70 for Slovenian vessels through Croatian territorial waters could not be considered as 
an adequate guarantee, since Slovenia would be subject to Croatian national legislation, 
procedures and restrictions. In their view, Croatia would have the right to temporarily suspend 
passage and hinder maritime traffic to and from Slovenian shores and harbours. Thus, the 
rights of Slovenia as a maritime State would be limited, and would heavily rely on Croatia’s 
goodwill. Therefore, Slovenia based its claims to a maritime junction across Croatian 
territorial waters on the necessity for Slovenia’s economic, security and safety interests.71  
 
2.2.2   Croatia’s claims 
The Republic of Croatia claims that the maritime border should be drawn in accordance with 
the principle of equidistance, i.e. the two States should draw a median line across the middle 
of the bay. Furthermore, the Croatian side views the several claims of Slovenia to be contrary 
to established regulations and principles of international maritime law.72 
 
In Croatia’s view, the thought of the Bay of Piran being internal waters of any State is out of 
question, since the bay was no longer in the possession of one common State (as was the case 
prior to 1991), but now being shared by two States. Thus, Croatia found it impossible to view 
the bay as internal waters of any State. Instead, Croatia claims that the bay should be regarded 
as territorial waters of both State, and in the arbitration, they opted for a maritime border 
delimitation made in accordance with the principle of equidistance.73 Furthermore, Croatia 
also claims that the SFRY never recognized the bay as internal waters of the former State. 
                                                
68 PCA, ‘Press Release – Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia’ (The Hague, 
29 June 2017) 6 (Henceforth ‘PCA Press Release’) <https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2175> accessed 
2 October 2020.   
69 ’Uti Possidetis Law and Legal Definition’ (USLegal, 2020) <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/uti-possidetis/> 
accessed 2 October 2020. 
70 ’Right of innocent passage’ is a well-established principle within the international maritime law, meaning that 
vessels of one flag-state has the right to traverse and navigate the territorial waters of a second state continuously 
and expeditiously. The right is treaty-based, generally recognized and implemented due to its importance for the 
freedom of trade. The principle dates back to the 1930s and has been incorporated into the TSC 1958, and later 
in UNLOSC 1982.  
71 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 329, para. 1030. 
72 Avbelj, Lentar Černič 6:6 and 6:10.  
73 PCA Press Release (n 68) 7.  
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Here, Croatia opposed the claims of Slovenia that official charts showed a closing line being 
drawn across the mouth of the bay, after the signing of the 1975 Osimo Treaty.74 Moreover, 
Croatia argued before the Arbitration Tribunal, that it was in fact the former and common 
Yugoslav State (which both were a part of) that exercised police and economic control in the 
bay, and not the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. Hence, Slovenia could not claim a historic 
title, since the modern-day Slovenian State has only existed since 1991. In Croatia’s view, 
this was Slovenia’s attempt to circumvent historical facts.75 
 
Croatia also disputes the claims of Slovenia to a maritime junction across Croatian territorial 
waters. According to Croatia, throughout the time that both States have been independent, 
there has not been any disruptions of Slovenia’s right to access the high seas through Croatian 
territorial sea. During the war in Croatia (1991-1995), no Croatian institution suspended the 
right of innocent passage for Slovenian vessels. In the view of Croatia, the reasoning behind 
Slovenia’s claim to a maritime junction was unnecessary and unjustified. This due to 
Slovenia’s right to access the high seas, right of innocent passage and future economic 
development was not dependent on Croatia’s goodwill, since Slovenia already have all the 
rights guaranteed through international treaties and conventions, which both States are parties 
to.76  
 
Furthermore, Croatia argued that both States are members of the EU. Since the core principle 
of the EU is the free movement of goods, capital, services and labour, and the territorial seas 
of Croatia and Slovenia are both subject to EU legislation, Slovenia should not worry about 
the possibility of Croatia preventing its economic development and vice versa. Regarding 
Slovenia’s claims to the junction based on security reasons, both States were at the time, and 
still are members of NATO. Hence, Croatia claimed that both are supposed to jointly uphold 
security in the northern Adriatic Sea.77 
  
2.2.3   The Arbitration Tribunal’s Final Award  
In 2009, the governments of Croatia and Slovenia signed the ‘Arbitration Agreement’, where 
the two sides expressed their willingness to solve the issue of maritime border delimitation 
within the Bay of Piran. Hence, an ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal was set up by the PCA.78 The 
tribunal was partly asked to determine where the maritime boundary in the Bay of Piran 
would be drawn. Furthermore, the Tribunal was tasked with assessing the prospects of 
Slovenia to gain a junction to the high seas, without passing through Croatian maritime 
waters.79  
 
                                                
74 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 246, para. 784 and 787. 
75 Ibid 258, para. 829-830.  
76 Ibid 332, para. 1036-1037. 
77 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 332, para. 1038.  
78 Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia (Slovenia-Croatia) (Stockholm, 4 November 2009) article 1, available at 
<https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2165> [Official English Version].  
79 Ibid article 3(1a-b).	
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Regarding the Bay of Piran, the Tribunal found that the bay itself had been declared as 
internal waters by SFRY according to national legislation in 1987. It was also concluded that 
there was no requirement to draw a closing line across the mouth of the bay under the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, in order for a bay to be 
considered as internal waters of a State. Nevertheless, the Tribunal acknowledged that such a 
provision has been included in UNCLOS, but since the convention only came into force in 
1994 and the SFRY ceased to exist in 1991, the provision was found to be irrelevant. Hence, 
the bay was found to be a historic bay on the 25 June 1991, the day of independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia. This was in favour of Slovenia’s claims.80 The Tribunal made reference 
to the ICJ case ‘Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/Honduras/Nicaragua), commonly referred to as ‘Gulf of Fonseca Case’ from 1992, 
where it was concluded that a bay that once was a part of one State, but due to historical 
events came to be shared by two or more States, may keep its status as a historic bay and 
constitute internal waters.81  
 
The Tribunal went on to delimit the bay between the two States. It was found that no 
delimitations within the bay had been made during the rule of the SFRY. In order to decide 
upon the matter, the Tribunal had to analyse what legal regulations were in force prior to the 
independence of the two States. The Tribunal concluded that the bay and the land area 
situated in its proximity was of greater importance to Slovenia than to Croatia. The Slovenian 
side had several thousand inhabitants. Their primary occupation includes fishing and 
agricultural work. On the other side, the Croatian part of the coast was largely deserted with 
no permanent settlements.82 Hence, the Tribunal concluded, in accordance with the principle 
of uti possidetis83, that Slovenia had had consecutive possession over the area, due to the 
presence of developed infrastructure both along the coast and in the bay. The Tribunal took 
into consideration that the Socialist Republic of Slovenia had enacted several legislative laws 
in order to regulate fishing activity within the bay throughout the second half of the 1900s. On 
the other hand, no institution of Socialist Republic of Croatia had neither shown any major 
presence in the bay, nor on the land close to it.84 
 
Slovenia has also, after independence, conducted marine scientific research within the whole 
bay through the Marine Biology Station in Piran. The Tribunal concluded that even though 
Croatia has claimed the southern part of the bay, it never disputed the Slovenian scientific 
research within it, despite being aware of such activity.85 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that 
Croatia never exercised its jurisdiction within the bay, but only formally claimed it to be a 
part of its sovereign territory.86  
 
                                                
80 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 271, para. 877-878.  
81 Ibid 272, para. 885 
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The Arbitration Tribunal concluded in the Final Award, based on the evidence put forth by 
the respective parties, that Slovenia did have more convincing arguments to gain the majority 
of the bay, based on the principle of uti possidetis. Hence, the Tribunal found that the 
maritime border would start from the southern St Odoric Canal87. Through this, the land strip 
between the canal and the Dragonja River, which is inhabited by a Slovene majority, was 
decided to be a part of Slovenia.88 As for the delimitation itself within the bay, Slovenia was 
granted three-quarters of the northern part and Croatia was granted one-quarter of the 
southern part of the bay.89 
 
The Tribunal went on to decide if the equidistance line could be used for border delimitations 
from the mouth of the bay, into the Adriatic Sea. Due to Slovenia’s coastal configuration 
facing north-west towards the Gulf of Trieste, and Croatia’s costal configuration generally 
facing south-west, apart from the coast adjacent to the Bay of Piran, the Slovenian territorial 
sea would be ‘boxed-in’.90 Hence, applying a strict equidistance line would generate more 
maritime area for Croatia due to the fact that the relatively short coastal strip along the bay is 
geographically facing north. However, the Tribunal found that the coastal strip heavily 
deviates from its mostly south-west facing coastal configuration.91 In conclusion, Slovenia’s 
territorial sea would be cut off from accessing the high seas and also boxed-in between the 
territorial seas of Italy and Croatia. Thus, the Tribunal concluded that the line of equidistance 
out into the Gulf of Trieste should be drawn from the ‘Cape Savudrija’, which is the southern 
entrance point of the bay, but Croatian territory, in accordance with the ICJ 1969 ‘North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case’.92 The tribunal acknowledged that the mentioned case concerned the 
delimitation of a continental shelf, and not the territorial sea of any State. Nonetheless, the 
tribunal found that the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ could equally be applied in cases 
concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea.93  
 
Moreover, the Tribunal was tasked to examine the Slovenian ‘junction’ to the high sea. It 
concluded that the territorial sea of Slovenia was in-between the territorial seas of Italy and 
Croatia, and at no point does it connect to international waters.94 The Tribunal showed 
significant understanding for Slovenia’s claims, based on economic, navigational and safety 
interests, that ships travelling to and from Slovenia should be able to do so without any risk of 
Croatian interference. The junction was decided to be 2.5 NM wide, situated across Croatian 
territorial sea, in-between the line that constitutes the maritime border between of Italy and 
Croatia.95 The Tribunal however, did not grant Slovenia the junction as a part of its territorial 
sea, but rather a junction through which ships and aircrafts going to and from Slovenian ports 
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88 The Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration Award 307, para. 991.   
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could freely traverse. The decision was based on the principle ‘Freedom of Communication’, 
which includes the right of navigation and overflight.96 Slovenia was not granted the freedoms 
that usually are included in a State’s sovereign rights in their respective maritime areas, as it 
is only to be used as transit passage. Hence, Slovenia does not have the right to exploit and 
explore the area for natural resources.97 
 
2.3   The Neum Corridor  
2.3.1   Neum Agreement  
The negotiations leading up to the 1999 ‘Neum Agreement’ (BiH-Croatia) included several 
issues that needed to be resolved. Worth mentioning is that, during the rule of the SFRY, 
there were no significant problems between the Socialist Republic of BiH and Croatia, 
respectively. But since the border between the two, post-1991, were declared as international 
borders, several issues arose that needed to be addressed.98 Before addressing the agreement, 
it is necessary to understand how the two newly independent States found themselves in a 
drastically different legal situation. 
 
The origins of the border disputes are more or less of geographic nature. The BiH city of 
Neum, by the Adriatic Coast, is dividing the Croatian land territory in two parts. At the same 
time, the maritime area of BiH is surrounded by Croatia, which means that ships travelling to 
and from BiH, must pass through Croatian internal and territorial waters en route to the high 
seas. Thus, ships to and from BiH are subject to Croatian laws and regulations. Neum does 
not hold a harbour and BiH has historically been dependent on the Croatian port in Ploče. 
Furthermore, the Peljesac Bridge, in the proximity of the maritime border between the two 
States, is currently being built to connect the two parts of Croatia.99 
 
According to the 1999 Neum Agreement, the border between the two States was based on the 
Badinter Arbitration Commission (full name ‘Arbitration Commission on the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia’) held at the beginning of the dissolution of the SFRY in 1991. The 
Badinter Arbitration Commission was set up by the predecessor of the EU, the European 
Economic Community (EEC), which consisted of five constitutional judges from France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium, whom were tasked with providing legal opinion 
regarding the dissolution of the former SFRY.100  
 
In ‘Opinion 3’ of the Badinter Commission, it was concluded that the already existing borders 
between the republics within the SFRY were to be considered as international borders after 
independence, in accordance with the principle of ‘uti possidetis’. Any changes of borders, 
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were to be made in accordance with future agreements between the States.101 Since Neum and 
the Dubrovnik-Neretva Country exclave had been a part of the Socialist Republics of BiH and 
Croatia respectively, and under separate jurisdiction for the entirety of SFRY, it was 
concluded that no unilateral changes to the borders would be made after independence. 
Furthermore, the borders between BiH and Croatia were reaffirmed once again after the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, which ended the war in the two countries.102 
Since the border remained the same, but the legal framework the two States are different, 
there was a need to resolve the issues mentioned above, that displayed themselves in the years 
after the end of the wars. The Neum Agreement aimed to resolve the border problems related 
to the Neum Corridor. As a part of the broader picture, apart from the problem of road transit 
between two parts of Croatia, the dispute with BiH also includes the questions of border 
delimitation at sea between the two States and the status of the islands Veliki and Mali 
Školj.103 Worth mentioning, is that the Neum Agreement was the first independent treaty 
regarding border delimitations made between States that have been a part of the SFRY.104 
 
2.3.2   Klek Peninsula  
The agreement aimed to resolve the situation in the maritime border region between Croatia 
and BiH, which include several legal problems. The Klek Peninsula is a part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovinia’s roughly 24 km long coast. But due to the State’s coastal configuration, its 
maritime border with Croatia only measures up to 10 km. In the Neum Agreement, it was 
decided that the maritime delimitation would be made in accordance with the equidistance 
principle.105  
 
During the negotiations, the parties based the land border delimitation on the SFRY ‘Act on 
State Survey and Real Estate Cadastre’, set up in 1974 by the former Assembly of SFRY. In 
the act, the whole peninsula was registered and declared as a part of the Socialist Republic of 
BiH. Both parties agreed that delimitation would be made in accordance with the records 
shown in the cadastre of SFRY.106 Cadastral law is the legal method through which public 
authorities hold record of ownership over a specific part of land.107  
 
However, the Croatian Dubrovnik-Neretva County, which is split in a northern and southern 
part by the Neum Corridor, opposed the treaty. The assembly of the county, which had not 
been involved in the negotiations leading up to the agreement, found the border delimitation 
set out in the agreement as incompatible. The very tip of the peninsula (Bos. Cro. ‘Vrh 
Kleka’) had historically been a part of the Republic of Ragusa (later the Republic of 
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Dubrovnik, and now the Republic of Croatia).108 Representatives of the county claimed that 
both the land and maritime border delimitation could not be based on status quo borders, but 
had to be made in accordance with the historical context. Nevertheless, since the end of the 
World War II, BiH has had the de facto and de jure control over the peninsula.109  
 
Representatives of the Dubrovnik-Neretva County claimed that if the proposed treaty was put 
up for debate in the Croatian Parliament (Cro. ‘Sabor’), it would be regarded as a 
constitutional issue. According to them, the Neum Agreement included the topic of border 
changes, which would mean that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Croatia would 
be jeopardized, in accordance with article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.110 
Worth mentioning is that the tip of the Klek Peninsula is not connected to any part of Croatian 
land territory, and any transport to the tip by road would have to pass through BiH territory. 
Nevertheless, the tip would be accessible from the rest of Croatia by sea.111  
 
2.3.3   Veliki and Mali Školj 
The Channel of Mali Ston (Bos. Cro. ‘Malostonski Zaljev’) is located between the Croatian 
Peljesac Peninsula, and the BiH Klek Peninsula. In the channel, two small and uninhabited 
islets are located, named Veliki and Mali Školj (lit. Big and Small Školj). Geographically, the 
islets are located closer to the BiH Klek Peninsula, than they are to the Croatian Peljesac 
Peninsula. During the negotiations leading to the Neum Agreement, it was concluded that the 
delimitation between BiH and Croatia would be made in accordance with the equidistance 
principle. Since the islands are closer to BiH, than they are to Croatia, they were considered to 
be within the territorial sea of BiH and under its sovereignty.112 Furthermore, the SFRY 1974 
‘Act on State Survey and Real Estate Cadastre’ defined the islands as being a part of the 
Socialist Republic of BiH. However, the Dubrovnik-Neretva County also objected this move, 
in the same protest note directed to the Croatian Parliament regarding the tip of the Klek 
Peninsula and claimed that the islands belonged to Croatia.113 
 
2.3.4   Aftermath and legal situation post-1999  
The Neum Agreement was officially signed by the Presidents of BiH and Croatia on the 8th of 
December 1999.114 However, due to the objections from the Croatian Dubrovnik-Neretva 
County, the Croatian Parliament decided not to ratify the Neum Agreement. Objections were 
also raised on the BiH side, due to domestic disagreements regarding the land border with 
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Croatia along the river Una in northern BiH, in the proximity of the Croatian city of Hrvatska 
Kostajnica and the BiH city of Kostajnica.115 
 
Due to this, both States failed to ratify the Neum Agreement. There have been no further 
negotiations regarding the border disputes in relation to the Neum Corridor. Nevertheless, 
both BiH and Croatia have applied provisions from the treaty and no confrontations have 
taken place between the parties in the area around Neum. However, a final solution to the 
maritime border delimitation still yet to be agreed upon, since the claims from 1999, of both 
States, remain the same.116 The major issue for BiH is the fact that SFRY never made any 
delimitations of the internal waters between the former socialist republics, since they were all 
a part of a common State. The use of straight baselines117 was established by the Yugoslav 
State in 1970.118 After the independence of the Republic of Croatia, the internal waters 
remained unchanged, and has ever since surrounded the territorial waters of the BiH. Thus, 
sea access to Neum, BiH, is only possible by passing through the internal waters of Croatia.119 
During the 2000s, the two parties showed signs of willingness to settle the dispute in an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal, similar to the procedure that took place between Slovenia and 
Croatia.120 Nevertheless, as of today, there has not been any progress regarding a final 
settlement between the two States since 1999.121 
 
2.3.5   Peljesac Bridge  
In the Neum Agreement from 1999, two provisions of the treaty are of interest. The main 
reason for the negotiations taking place were the infrastructural, road- and business-related 
issues that both parties faced. For Croatia, the aim was to achieve an undisturbed and 
unhindered flow of traffic between its two separated parts of land territory, through BiH. For 
BiH, it was important to gain undisturbed and unhindered access to the Croatian Port of 
Ploče, since Neum does not hold a port of its own, in order to export and import goods 
originating from BiH.122 The provision guaranteeing the rights recently mentioned, are found 
in article 2 of the Neum Agreement. Furthermore, according to article 3, the parties agreed not 
to collect tolls, taxes and other charges from vehicles or ships in transit through Neum and the 
Port of Ploče.123 
 
As mentioned, the treaty was negotiated in 1999 and it has not been ratified nor entered into 
force to this day. The hope of undisturbed and unhindered passage between the two parts of 
Croatia, as defined in the Neum Agreement, has not become a reality since border checks are 
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carried out by both Croatian and BiH border control when passing through the Neum 
Corridor.124 The accession of Croatia to the EU and NATO has led to a drastically changed 
geopolitical situation in the area, as BiH remains an aspiring candidate for membership in the 
two organisations. This has been the main incentive for Croatia’s desire to build a road bridge 
which would connect the two parts of Croatia, bypassing Neum and BiH.125 
 
The history behind the project ‘Peljesac Bridge’ was for the first time raised by members of 
the Croatian Parliament from the Dubrovnik-Neretva County in 1997. In 2000, the Croatian 
Government at that time, decided that the bridge would be built, since the Neum Agreement 
with its provisions was not considered as a viable and acceptable option. However, the 
building of the bridge has been controversial.126 
 
The Peljesac Bridge is currently being built just north of Neum, on the Croatian side, across 
the Channel of Mali Ston, to the Croatian Peljesac Peninsula. The peninsula is connected to 
the southern part of Croatia that is separated by Neum, BiH.127 The construction of the bridge 
has raised concerns in BiH, due to the fact that the only seaway in and out of Neum is through 
the Channel of Mali Ston, across which the bridge is currently being built. Prior to the 
commencing of the construction, BiH officials argued that the bridge would prevent sea 
access to Neum. The first projection of the bridge concluded that the bridge would be 35 
meters high, but due to complaints from BiH, this was later modified to 55 meters in 
height.128 
 
In 2017, the European Commission decided to grant Croatia funds of up to 357 million euros, 
which is approximately 85 % of the project’s total cost and is a part of the EU’s regional 
policy for development. The EU supports the Croatian cause of connecting its two parts of 
territory, as Croatia aims to become a member of the Schengen Area. The bridge is seen as an 
infrastructural project which will facilitate trade and tourism, as well as fully connecting 
Croatia with itself.129 In contrast, the BiH side has opposed the building of the bridge due to 
the fact that the maritime border between the States in the Neum area has not been settled, 
since the Neum Agreement has never been ratified. BiH also claims that the bridge is being 
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built within its territorial waters and that its rights as a maritime State to access the high seas 
would be limited if the bridge is built.130 
 
BiH has consistently claimed that Croatia needs approval from BiH in order to build the 
bridge. However, Croatia has never asked for the permission of BiH, since it is considered a 
domestic question. In BiH’s view, the construction is seen as a violation of its rights 
according to UNCLOS. Nevertheless, Croatia has still made modifications of the bridge, to be 
in accordance with some of the requests coming from BiH. For instance, the height of the 
bridge was modified by additional 15 meters, and the pillars of the bridge are being placed 
every 200 meters, in order for ships to be able to enter Neum and BiH.131  
 
Furthermore, ships traveling to and from BiH, must still pass through Croatia’s internal 
waters when en route to international waters, where the regime of ‘innocent passage’ of 
foreign ships does not have to be tolerated. However, Croatia has said that its straits hold 
international status, which effectively means that vessels going to Neum have the right to 
freely navigate in Croatian waters. Thus, the claims of BiH, that its right to access the high 
seas has been deemed by Croatia as irrelevant to stop the construction of the bridge.132 
  
As of 2020, the construction of the Peljesac Bridge is on-going, and it is expected to be 
opened by summer 2022.133 
 
2.4   The Prevlaka Peninsula  
The Republic of Croatia and the State of Montenegro share a land-border with a length of 
only 16 km. The Prevlaka Peninsula is Croatia’s most southern tip. From 1992 until 2002, UN 
peacekeeping troops held presence on the peninsula. The position of the peninsula is of 
strategic importance, since it is in the proximity of the Bay of Kotor (BCMS. Boka Kotorska), 
which houses one of Montenegro’s major harbours. Having been a demilitarized area, but 
claimed by both the FRY and Croatia, it was reintegrated under the jurisdiction of Croatia in 
2002.134 During the beginning of the war in Croatia (1991-1995) the Prevlaka Peninsula was 
the scene of intense fighting between the Croatian and the SFRY armies.135 
 
2.4.1   A Temporary Solution  
The ‘Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)’ was signed on the 10th of December 2002. The name states that it is 
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only temporary and that the issue will have to be addressed at one point in the future, in order 
to reach a final settlement over the delimitation of the maritime border. Worth mentioning is 
that there has not been any major incident between the two States since the signing.136 The 
reason for the temporary agreement being signed was primarily to normalize relations 
between Croatia and FRY. This step was widely seen as important for the whole stability of 
the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the border between Croatia and Montenegro is in the 
middle of many historical and touristic points, which has further contributed to economic 
development on both sides of the border.137 
 
The State of Montenegro declared its independence from Serbia and Montenegro (previously 
‘FRY’) in 2006. This event changed the character of the border dispute. Croatia and 
Montenegro have maintained good bilateral relations and widely consider each other as good 
neighbours. Both States share a similar vision regarding the future of the ex-Yugoslav 
countries and their membership within the EU and NATO.138 However, the Temporary 
Protocol is set to be in force until the two sides reach a final and permanent agreement 
regarding the maritime border delimitation. As of 2020, there is yet a need for the two 
neighbours to agree on a permanent solution regarding the maritime border.139 
  
2.4.2   The Bay of Kotor 
The dispute between Croatia and Montenegro concerns the maritime delimitation of the 
territorial sea in the proximity of the Prevlaka Peninsula, as well as the delimitation of the 
continental shelf in the Adriatic Sea. The peninsula is located at the entrance of the 
Montenegrin Bay of Kotor, which holds several major harbours, the Tivat Airport and two of 
Montenegro’s major cities, Herceg-Novi and Kotor. Historically, the control of the entrance 
of the bay has been important for both parties. However, in modern times, both States have 
joined NATO, which has played-down the security concerns in the area, and has shifted focus 
on economic- and touristic-related reasons to find a solution.140 
 
The 2002 Temporary Protocol, established a legal regime over and around the Prevlaka 
Peninsula and the entrance of the Bay of Kotor. The land territory was to remain temporarily 
as a part of Croatia. On the one hand, the surrounding waters, effectively at the entrance itself 
was to be shared by joint controls of both States. The main issue for Montenegro is that the 
control over the entrance of the Bay of Kotor is, according to the protocol, shared between the 
two States.141 Croatia does not have any harbours, nor any significant population in the 
proximity of the peninsula. On the other hand, Montenegro has over 100 km of coastline 
within the bay, with several economic and security interests. Furthermore, around ten percent 
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of the total Montenegrin population live along the coastline that stretches along the shores of 
the Bay of Kotor.142  
 
Furthermore, due to the fact that the protocol was signed in 2002, when the geopolitical 
situation in the area was drastically different than it is today, some provisions have lost its 
relevance today, primarily the security-related ones. The harbours in Montenegro have 
practically been transformed from previously holding naval ships, to house yachts instead, 
used primarily by tourists visiting the area. Nonetheless, maritime delimitation within the bay, 
and at its entrance, remains an open issue since the sovereignty at the entrance of the bay is 
divided. Namely, both States hold an equal number of shipping lanes, despite that more or 
less all shipping activity that takes place in the Bay of Kotor has Montenegro as its first or 
final destination.143  
 
2.4.3   Border Delimitation of the Territorial Sea  
The maritime area, adjacent to the Prevlaka Peninsula and the entrance of the Bay of Kotor, 
which in turn is considered to be the territorial seas of both the Republic of Croatia and the 
State of Montenegro, is rich in natural resources. However, the maritime border between the 
two States in the territorial seas is disputed, since the parties have not agreed on a suitable 
delimitation of the maritime border within the Bay of Kotor, from which the border is to be 
drawn from. This caused a smaller, but not insignificant, diplomatic dispute between the two 
States, when Croatia decided to explore and exploit the disputed area for oil and gas minerals 
in 2015.144 
 
On the other hand, in Croatia’s view, the maritime border between the two States, at the 
entrance of the Bay of Kotor, does not pose an issue. It has consistently claimed that the land 
borders between the ex-Yugoslav States shall remain the same as prior to 1991, and that the 
line of delimitation should be drawn just north-east of the peninsula, and then follow the 
equidistance principle out into the high seas. The peninsula was considered, at the time of 
independence, to be a part of the Republic of Croatia. Thus, relying on international maritime 
law, the Prevlaka Peninsula must generate territorial waters of Croatia, even if the Bay of 
Kotor is practically of greater legal, geographical and economical importance to 
Montenegro.145 Nonetheless, Croatia states that it has both sovereignty and sovereign rights in 
a small part of the Bay of Kotor, and over its territorial waters, which currently overlap with 
the claims of Montenegro.146 
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The State of Montenegro defined its claims over its proposed territorial sea in 2011 and again 
through national legislation on the 30th October 2014147, which was regarded by Croatia as a 
deviation from the 2002 Temporary Protocol, resulting in a diplomatic protest note being sent 
to the Montenegrin government.148 Currently, the two States have overlapping claims over a 
maritime area of roughly 1892 km2.149 The claim of Montenegro came roughly twelve years 
after the signing of the 2002 Temporary Protocol. The reason for this is primarily due to 
Montenegro’s concern regarding the legal regime currently in place at the entrance of the Bay 
of Kotor.  
 
Montenegro has also consistently rejected Croatia’s claims to settle the maritime border 
according to the principle of equidistance. In their view, the use of the principle would result 
in an uneven share of territorial sea. The reason for this is the peninsula’s south-eastern 
geographical position and would disproportionately favour Croatia.150 Croatia’s claims are 
similar to the ones that they presented at the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal, regarding the 
dispute in the Bay of Piran.151 Instead, Montenegro opts for a delimitation according to the 
principle of equity, which is also a recognized tool within international maritime law, based 
on proportionality.152 The principle was first projected in the ICJ 1969 ‘North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case’. It takes into account the geographical features of a State’s coastal 
configuration.153 
  
2.4.4   International arbitration or a permanent bilateral agreement? 
In 2008, the two States agreed that the border dispute would be settled through an 
international arbitration.154 Moreover, in 2015, an inter-State commission was set up, with the 
goal to achieve a bilateral solution, but no further progress was made. In 2016, Montenegro’s 
prime minister reaffirmed that the ICJ or any international court should mediate in the 
dispute, if no bilateral agreement is made. On the other hand, Croatia has since changed its 
position, due to the outcome of the Slovenian-Croatian arbitration in 2017. Therefore, they 
have been relatively reluctant to bring the case before an arbitration tribunal, and instead 
opted that the two States should solve the issue bilaterally.155 
 
Montenegro fears that the dispute could bring complications to its negotiations with the EU 
for its aspired future membership in the organization. In other words, that its accession to the 
Union would be delayed or even prevented by Croatia. Namely, the European Commission 
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released a statement in 2018, where it made clear that potential members must solve its border 
disputes with current members of the Union.156 
 
Nonetheless, the Temporary Protocol from 2002, is largely followed by both States, but it 
does not address the issue of a permanent maritime border delimitation in an adequate 
manner. How it is to be solved is yet to be decided either through a bilateral agreement or 
through the process of arbitration.157 
  
2.5   Summary  
The break-up of the SFRY during the 1990s has resulted in several border disputes between 
the now independent States. The Republic of Croatia is currently involved in border disputes 
with four out of its five neighbours. Three border disputes are taking place in the Adriatic Sea. 
The SFRY never made any maritime delimitations between its socialist republics, since the 
Yugoslav Authorities never regarded delimitation as an internal issue, due to the fact that the 
territorial waters in the Adriatic Sea was part of the same State. This has proved to have 
negative effects on the bilateral relations between the States. As of 2020, there are still no 
clear and settled border delimitations at sea between Croatia and its neighbours, Slovenia, 
BiH and Montenegro. The Slovene-Croatian maritime border is the only case which has been 
brought before international arbitration. Nonetheless, the Tribunals Final Award has not been 
recognized by Croatia, and the dispute is still on-going. As for the disputes between BiH and 
Montenegro, there have been bilateral negotiations and agreements, but neither of the two 
cases have resulted in a permanent maritime border delimitation. Thus, both disputes are still 
on-going, as of 2020. Currently, there are no projections of when, nor how the disputes can be 
settled since the involved States have largely overlapping and contradicting maritime claims.  
 
3   Law of the Sea and Maritime Border Delimitations 
In order to understand the maritime border disputes along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea 
and the legal questions related to them, it is important to put the disputes into the context of 
international maritime law. Firstly, this chapter provides a brief historic overview regarding 
the law of the sea, its principles upon which it rests and UNCLOS. Thereafter, it deconstructs 
treaty law and case law regarding maritime border delimitations, with primary focus on article 
15 of UNCLOS. Thereafter, a presentation of several relevant and special circumstances is 
displayed, since they have proven to have significant effect on cases which have been brought 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS).  
 
3.1   Law of the Sea  
3.1.1   Historic overview  
Throughout history, mankind has used the oceans for a variety of reasons. In ancient Egypt, 
technological development led to widespread commerce of materials through shipping. 
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Nonetheless, it was in Roman times that maritime jurisprudence made its first progression. 
Since the whole Mediterranean Sea was under Roman control, there was a need to uphold 
shipping as a means of transport within the Empire. But threats against ships and seafarers, 
such as looters were present in the Mediterranean, which created the need of a legal 
framework which would regulate conduct and prevent crimes at sea.158 
 
As empires rose and fell, customary international maritime law remained. However, they 
were largely unwritten and generally needed further clarification. The first attempt to codify 
the law of the sea happened during The Hague Conference for the Codification of 
International Law in 1930. Even though the conference did not result in a binding treaty, the 
parties managed to recognize some of the most important principles of International Maritime 
Law, such as freedom of navigation, right of innocent passage and a State’s territorial 
sovereignty over its territorial sea.159 Despite that several international conferences were held 
throughout the 20th century, with the aim of codifying the customary international maritime 
law, it was not until the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which resulted in the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (henceforth ‘UNCLOS’).160  
 
The creation of UNCLOS is considered to be the milestone in the long-sought codification 
process of the law of the sea. It is widely considered to be the first comprehensive treaty 
within the legal field, since it regulates a wide range of marine activities. The treaty also 
includes limits for the various maritime zones, which have historically been interpreted 
differently by States.161  
  
3.1.2   The principles of the law of the sea  
International law, and in particular international maritime law differentiates itself from 
national legislation, since international law heavily depends on States coming together and 
creating common obligations, that are to be generally applicable across different 
jurisdictions.162 There are three legal principles within international maritime law, which are 
considered to be universally accepted.163 
 
The principle of freedom is considered to be the fundament that has historically dominated the 
law of the sea. Freedoms that are incorporated into the principle are freedom of navigation, 
overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands, fishing 
and marine scientific research. The history behind the principle stretches back to the end of 
the 15th century, when the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal divided the oceans between 
themselves in a western and eastern part, respectively. The Dutch philosopher and jurist Hugo 
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Grotius wrote the book Mare Liberum by the turn of the century. The book included the idea 
that the principle of freedom is necessary, in order to uphold the economic and political 
interests of maritime powers around the globe.164  
 
The principle of sovereignty, together with the principle of freedom, are the two principles 
that have traditionally been of utmost importance for the law of the sea. Upholding 
sovereignty is of significant interest to any State, since it needs to protect its borders and 
territory. In the context of the law of the sea, the principle allows a coastal State to expand its 
sovereignty across its internal and territorial sea.165 Under customary law and UNCLOS, a 
State can claim up to 12 NM of territorial sea, which falls under the sovereignty of the coastal 
State.166  
 
The principle of the common heritage of mankind focuses on preserving the interests of the 
whole mankind, as opposed to the two former principles, which instead focuses on the 
interests of individual States. What is interesting regarding the discussion of ‘mankind’ in 
relation to the law of the sea, is that it has historically not been mentioned as a principle. 
Instead, it is considered to be a new factor that has gained importance during the past 
century.167 
 
3.2   Maritime Border Delimitations  
3.2.1   Overview  
Maritime border delimitation is the process of establishing lines that are to separate and 
delimitate the territories of two or more States out in the sea. The reason why this kind of 
legal mechanism is important, is due to the fact that States may exercise its sovereignty and 
sovereign rights over their respective maritime areas.168 Coastal States that are opposite or 
adjacent to each other, are to mutually decide over the maritime border delimitation. Hence, 
maritime border delimitations are often regulated through bilateral treaties, since States are 
expected to cooperate in order to draw and settle borders at sea. However, maritime border 
delimitations may also be of unilateral character. For example, if a coastal State’s maritime 
claims do not overlap with another State, then such delimitations can be accepted if they are 
in line with international treaties and customary law.169  
 
3.2.2   Treaty Law  
International maritime law requires predictability.170 Thus, maritime border delimitations 
have been regulated through several international treaties. According to 1958 Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (henceforth ‘TSC’) article 12, delimitations of 
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the territorial sea171 are to be made in accordance with the equidistance principle, i.e. a 
median line shall be drawn between two States that are opposite or adjacent to each other. 
However, if a State claims that there are special circumstances or a historic title over a 
maritime area, exceptions can be made from the primary principle.172 The TSC 1958 entered 
into force in 1964, and has 52 State parties, out of which 41 States are signatory parties to it. 
This includes the USA, the Russian Federation and several European States.173 
 
According to article 1 of the TSC 1958, a State can extend its sovereignty beyond its land 
territory into its adjacent maritime area, i.e. territorial sea. Furthermore, a State also holds full 
sovereignty of the air space, seabed and subsoil over and within its territorial sea.174 Through 
this, the State acquires full legal powers, equal to those it has over its land territory.175  
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 came into force in 1994. It has 168 
State parties to it, with 157 States as signatory members. Significant parties to the convention 
are the EU and its members, The People’s Republic of China and The Russian Federation.176 
The USA is, however, not a party to the convention, since conservative powers in Washington 
D.C. have viewed UNCLOS as a treaty that would potentially undermine the sovereignty of 
the USA.177 
 
In UNCLOS, provisions concerning maritime border delimitations are largely based on the 
TSC 1958, but with a few additions. In the TSC 1958, there were no specific provisions as for 
how far a State can claim its territorial sea, which has historically been considered 
controversial. For instance, Latin American States have previously claimed up to 200 NM, 
whereas the UK has claimed only three NM of territorial waters, which has made customary 
law and State practice somewhat obscure, at least until the creation of UNCLOS.178  
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3.2.3   The Principle of Equidistance  
The principle of equidistance first emerged and was defined in article 6 of the TSC 1958179, 
and entered into force in 1964.180 In the official version of UNCLOS 1982, the same article 
was included under article 15.181 
 
Article 15.1 
Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
 
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two 
States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is 
measured.182 
 
According to UNCLOS, the primary legal rule is that maritime border delimitations are to be 
made in accordance with the equidistance principle, i.e. the line is to be measured through a 
median, which should be situated in the middle of two nearest points from the baseline 
(measured from the coasts of two or more States).183 However, it is worth mentioning that the 
ICJ, in its many cases concerning maritime border delimitations, has not found the principle 
to be considered a binding rule within international maritime law, but rather a method that can 
be used in the court process and proceedings.184 Furthermore, the ICJ views both article 6 in 
TSC 1958 and article 15 in UNCLOS 1982, to be a part of international customary law in 
cases concerning maritime delimitation disputes. This was highlighted in the ‘Qatar/Bahrain 
Case’ 2001, where the court concluded that both provisions were considered as applicable, 
despite the fact that neither State was a party to the Treaty.185  
 
Moreover, the principle has been widely used in State practice, since governments have found 
that drawing an equidistance line to be a reasonable starting point in maritime delimitation 
disputes. Such an approach has generally been supported by judges in the ICJ.186 This kind of 
reasoning within the ICJ has come to be called the ‘three stage result-oriented approach’. At 
the first stage, the court applies the principle of equidistance. If the end-result is found to be 
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inequitable, i.e. unjust or unequal, the court proceeds to the second stage and focuses on 
‘equity-correction’. Thirdly, according to UNCLOS and customary law, the court is to 
examine if there are special circumstances on any side, that could opt for further adjustments 
to the delimitation process. When the legal process has passed all three stages, the court is 
ready to disclose the final judgement.187  
 
However, it is argued that the three-stage approach used by the ICJ in court proceedings, have 
led to a decline in use and application of the principle of equidistance. The reasons behind this 
are the legal developments regarding ‘special circumstances’ that have come to play a more 
decisive role in the cases brought before the ICJ and ITLOS.188 Nonetheless, the principle still 
remains to be an important starting point in these cases.189 
 
3.2.4   Special Circumstances  
Article 15.2 
The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title 
or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which 
is at variance therewith.190 
  
As depicted in section 3.2.3 above, the principle of equidistance is not considered to be the 
only method that can be used in cases concerning maritime border delimitations. The 
provisions which fall under article 15(2) in UNCLOS (i.e. ‘special circumstances’) have 
generally been viewed as a complementary part of the whole provision, and not as exceptions 
from the principle of equidistance. This approach allows the courts and tribunals to be more 
flexible in the proceedings leading up to the final judgements.191 As the latter part of the 
article states, the principle of equidistance does not necessarily have to be applicable if a State 
can argue that ‘special circumstances’ are present in the specific case.192 The concept of 
special circumstances has been incorporated into UNCLOS, due to the risk of delimitations 
being made in an inequitable manner. Worth mentioning is that the treaty does not provide a 
clear answer as to what specific circumstances are to be considered as ‘special’. However, 
clarification and guidance is found in international case law and State practices.193  
 
In the jurisprudence of international maritime law, within the field of maritime border 
delimitations, there are two divisions regarding special and relevant circumstances. These are 
(1) Geographical Factors and (2) Non-Geographical Factors.194 Below follows an overview of 
relevant factors, however, it shall be noted that not all types of ‘special circumstances’ that 
have been brought before international courts are mentioned. Hence, it is not to be viewed as 
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an exhaustive list of circumstances that have been (or may be in the future) brought before 
international courts by States in cases concerning maritime border delimitation cases.  
 
3.2.5   Geographical Factors  
3.2.5.1   Configuration of Coasts 
In areas where a maritime border dispute is taking place, States often have different and/or 
overlapping claims over a limited maritime area that is adjacent to respective State’s 
coastline. Historically, there are several cases where States have solved disputes in a peaceful 
manner, i.e. through court proceedings at the ICJ.195 In any international court or tribunal, 
proceedings firstly tend to apply the principle of equidistance, with no reference to the 
configuration of any States’ coast. However, in several cases, the principle has resulted with 
inequitable results for one or more States. In the 1969 ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf Case 
(Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands), the ICJ found that Germany, with a concave 
(inward) coastline, gained an inequitable proportion of maritime territory, since the Danish 
and Dutch coastlines are convex (outward). This resulted in a ‘sandwich-effect’ for Germany, 
since its maritime area would have been ‘boxed-in’ between the area of the remaining two 
States.196  
 
Similar methodology and rhetoric is to be found in several cases that followed the 1969 North 
Sea Continental Shelf Case. For instance, in the ICJ judgement in the Libya/Malta Case from 
1985 and the ITLOS197 Bangladesh/Myanmar Case from 2012. In the latter case, the tribunal 
found that the application of the equidistance principle in the Bay of Bengal resulted in a ‘cut-
off-effect’ for Bangladesh, due to its concave coastline. Thus, had an adjustment of the 
equidistance line not been made the bay, the result would have been inequitable for 
Bangladesh, when compared with Myanmar.198 
  
3.2.5.2   Proportionality  
Proportionality is a second legal special circumstance that international courts have taken into 
account in the process of maritime border delimitation. Originally, proportionality was first 
mentioned in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, as a relevant circumstance, due to 
the different coastal configurations of the involved States.199 The Federal Republic of 
Germany (former West Germany), argued that States that are adjacent to each other should 
‘receive a just and equitable share’ of the North Sea continental shelf. However, the ICJ 
rejected this specific claim from West Germany. But the court acknowledged that if two or 
more States share a similar coastal length, they should receive an equal treatment in the 
process of delimitation. Hence, if the application of the equidistance principle would result in 
one State gaining less maritime area than the others, the border should be adjusted in a way 
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that would be more ‘equal or comparable’ to the two other States.200 Therefore, the ICJ 
concluded that there must be a balance between States that have concave coastlines, which 
produce significantly smaller amount of maritime area (as is the case with Germany), and 
States that have convex coastlines which, on the contrary, grants such States a more 
disproportional amount of maritime territory.201 
  
In cases brought before the ICJ, prominent scholars within international maritime law have 
argued that the court had not, in the cases produced in the recent decades, been consistent in 
depicting exactly how the concept of proportionality in maritime delimitations is to be 
interpreted and applied.202 Nonetheless, it is today widely agreed that international maritime 
law jurisprudence has reached a sufficient amount of consistency and predictability regarding 
the concept of proportionality, thanks to the 2009 ‘Black Sea Case’ between Romania and 
Ukraine.203 In the mentioned case, the ICJ concluded that when delimitation disputes arise, 
firstly, the principle of equidistance shall be applied, and if it proves that the ratio between the 
maritime areas between two or more States are inequitable and disproportioned, adjustments 
to the primary delimitation line must be made. Worth mentioning is that the ICJ did not view 
proportionality to be a method, but rather a concept to consider in order to ensure that 
maritime border disputes do not result in disproportionate delimitations in such cases.204 
 
3.2.5.3   Baselines  
The term ‘baselines’ is mentioned in article 15(1) of UNCLOS. Maritime baselines are the 
starting points from which the equidistance line is measured. Hence, before deciding the 
starting points, it is important to locate a State’s baseline. There are two types of baselines 





Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the 
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale 
charts officially recognized by the coastal State.205 
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The first type is ‘normal baselines’, which simply follows the geography (configuration) of 
the coast. The baseline is to be measured from the low-water line, i.e. during low-tide and 
from the point at which the water is furthest away from the coast.206 From there, a provisional 





1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining 
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured. (…)208 
 
The second type are ‘straight baselines’, which are more suitable for States with geographical 
irregularities along their coast. Such practice result in baselines which are drawn in a matter 
of connecting islands and rocks that lie off the specific State’s irregular coastline.209 The main 
difference between the two methods is that straight baselines are drawn across waters, while 
normal baselines are drawn along the State’s coast.210 Worth mentioning is that article 7 in 
UNCLOS does include further provisions to which a State must abide by. For instance, when 
a relevant authority in a State is to draw straight baselines, it must follow the general direction 
of the main coast, and the maritime area must be ‘closely linked’ to the land, in order to be 
classed as internal waters of the State.211 Furthermore, the baseline may only be drawn to and 
from islands that have some kind of man-made installations, such as lighthouses, and they 
also have to be above sea level at all times, notwithstanding sea tides. Hence, low-tide 
elevations are not to be used when drawing straight baselines.212 Finally, straight baselines of 
one State may not cross into, nor cut-off another State’s territorial sea to and from the high 
seas or its EEZ.213 
  
Finally, it shall also be mentioned that article 14 in UNCLOS allows a State to use a 
combination of both methods, since the coast configuration of a State might make it simpler 
to apply the first method along one part of the coast, and the second along another part.214 
 
The reason as to why baselines are relevant in the process of maritime delimitation between 
two or more States, is thanks to the equidistance line being measured from the States’ 
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baseline. The ICJ has raised the question of baselines in connection to the ‘special 
circumstances’ criteria. It has been found that in some cases, the application of either method 
of baselines has resulted in inequitable delimitations, which has been one of the causes as to 
why the cases had been brought before the Court in the first place.215 For instance, in the ICJ 
1999 ‘Eritrea/Yemen Case’, the Court dismissed a stretch of the pre-drawn Eritrean straight 
baseline, which include the ‘Negileh Rock’. It was concluded by the Court that the ‘rock’ was 
in fact a reef (maritime feature) from which the baseline could not be drawn. It was 
considered as too small, uninhabited and too far from larger islands.216 In turn, this led to an 
adjustment of the Eritrean straight baseline.217 Similar reasoning of the Court is found in the 
ICJ 1985 ‘Libya/Malta Case’, where the Maltese rock of Filfla did not constitute a feature 
named in article 7 of UNCLOS, from which a straight baseline would be measured. This also 
lead to adjustment of the line.218  
  
In conclusion, it shall be said that even though States are free to choose any method, 
judgements from international courts show that they do not hold a too liberal approach in 
cases concerning straight baselines.219  
 
3.2.5.4 Presence of islands 
The legal definition of an island is found in article 121 of UNCLOS. Criteria set up include 
that it must be a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water. Furthermore, it needs to 
be able to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own in order to be able to 
generate an EEZ or CS to the State in question.220 In general, islands have been found to 
constitute a relevant circumstance which the Court has given a varying amount of importance 
to.221 Jurisprudence of international maritime law provide different interpretations and 
solutions, since islands are different in geographic shape, nature and substance. However, 
what is generally agreed is that there are four types of ‘effect’ which islands can generate to a 
coastal State.222 
 
Islands that are considered as an integral part of a State’s coastal configuration and can 
sustain a population and/or economic life are given ‘full effect’, i.e. generate territorial sea of 
its own up to 12 NM. The second type is ‘no effect’, where generally rocks and insignificant 
features out at sea are found.223 The third type is that islands may also create maritime 
enclaves, if they are located too far from the coastal State, under whose sovereignty they fall. 
This reasoning was used in the 1977 ‘Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case’, concerning the 
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Channel Islands (part of the United Kingdom) located just off the French coast. The ICJ first 
took into consideration the main maritime border between the UK and French mainland and 
concluded that if full effect would be given to the islands, it would result in an inequitable 
result on behalf of France. Therefore, the islands became UK enclaves and were given 12 NM 
of territorial sea, but they became encircled by French maritime areas.224 The fourth, and last 
type is ‘partial effect’, or as it is also known, ‘half-effect’. The Court elaborated this type in 
the 1984 ‘Gulf of Maine’ (USA/Canada) case where the Canadian Seal Island was found to be 
geographically too far from mainland Canada. However, the island held a sizable number of 
inhabitants and it did in fact fulfil the legal criteria to qualify as an ‘island’.225 Hence, the 
island could not be fully disregarded, and was given partial effect, which resulted in an 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line.226  
  
In conclusion, the assessment of islands and their specific importance in cases regarding 
maritime border delimitation differs, and must be examined on a case-by-case basis. This type 
of approach was raised in the ITLOS 2012 ‘Bangladesh/Myanmar Case’ and is a consequence 
of an island’s unique geographical positions and socio-economic features. Hence, it is not 
possible to find one general rule concerning islands which may be applied, since every case, 
brought before international courts, is unique. In the end, the aim is to reach a result which is 
equitable for all parties involved.227 
 
3.2.6   Non-Geographical Factors  
3.2.6.1   Economic Factors  
There are various reasons as to why maritime border disputes between States may arise in the 
first place. Disputed maritime areas do often hold treasures that are of economic interest for 
the State and/or its citizens. A common motivating factor to various maritime claims can, but 
must not exclusively have to, be natural resources in a specific area, such as oil, gas and living 
organisms which habitat the sea.228 In recent times, noticeable news reports have been made 
regarding the maritime border disputes in the Aegean Sea (between Greece and Turkey)229 
and in the South China Sea (between the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam)230, where the involved States have overlapping claims 
over the same maritime areas. All of which are more or less driven by economic (but not 
exclusively) reasons, since both areas are rich in natural resources.231 
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In general, the ICJ has not accepted legal claims based on economic factors as an exclusive 
principle to grant the State in question the claimed maritime area.232 Nonetheless, in cases that 
have been presented before the Court, States have often raised economic factors in their 
claims to a given maritime area.233 In the 2002 ‘Cameroon/Nigeria Case’, the two parties put 
forth overlapping maritime claims over an area rich in oil and gas resources. The court 
concluded that despite that the Nigerian government had granted oil concessions (i.e. given 
permits to companies in order for them to explore and extract oil and gas resources) in the 
disputed maritime area between the two States234. The court found that such State practice 
could not in itself pose as a relevant circumstance which would suffice in order to neither 
change nor adjust the provisional delimitation line.235  
 
The Court has dismissed economic factors as a relevant claim in all cases, apart from one 
exception, which can be found in the 1993 ‘Greenland/Jan Mayen Case’ (Denmark v. 
Norway).236 In this specific case, the governments of Denmark, Norway and Iceland had prior 
to the Court proceedings, agreed to a ‘joint conservation and management regime’ for fishing 
stocks in the North Atlantic Ocean.237 The Court took the agreement into account since it was 
found that changes to the median line could potentially result in ‘catastrophic repercussions 
for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned’.238  
 
Hence, in jurisprudence of international maritime law, economic factors have not, in general, 
been viewed as a sufficient independent ‘special circumstance’. Instead, the States have had 
to justify their maritime claims with other relevant legal substance. Nonetheless, it may be 
said that the Court has been encouraging in having States enter ‘joint development regimes’ 
and bilateral agreements, as seen in the Greenland/Jan Mayen Case. This approach allows 
flexibility when assessing economic questions in the Court proceedings.239 
 
3.2.6.2   Conduct of Parties  
In cases where no maritime boundary between States have been previously agreed, the Court 
has looked into previous conduct of States, which has proved to have some, although limited, 
effect in judgements concerning ‘special circumstances’.240 In the 1982 ‘Tunisia/Libya Case’, 
the Court gave attention to the fact that the States had historically conducted in such a way, 
where they had governed on respective side of a ‘de facto’ boundary, which had been 
established in 1919.241 In the judgement from 1982, the Court concluded that neither State had 
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contested the conduct of the other. Thus, the boundary line established in 1919 was the modus 
vivendi242 line, and would continue to be the official maritime boundary.243  
 
However, it must be mentioned that no subsequent case brought before the ICJ has been 
subject to similar treatment and legal rhetoric, even though the question of ‘conduct of 
parties’ has been raised.244 E.g. the Court did not reaffirm its reasoning from the 
Tunisia/Libya Case, regarding previous conduct of States in the 1984 ‘Gulf of Maine’ 
(USA/Canada) and in the 2002 ‘Cameroon/Nigeria Cases’.245 
 
3.2.6.3   Historic Title and Historic Rights  
In article 15(2) of UNCLOS, ‘historic title’ stands as an explicit circumstance, and may 
equally be applied as an exception to the primary rule regarding the principle of 
equidistance.246 The definition of ‘historic title’ can be described as a State’s historic right to a 
land and maritime area, due to previous usage in a specific area.247 A historic right is assessed 
through evidence such as a State’s authority which has exercised continuous sovereignty in 
the area under a long period of time. Moreover, a State’s historic title is cemented even 
further if other States have not contested the claims of the first mentioned State.248 
 
It may also be said the concept of ‘historic title’ and ‘historic rights’ shall not be confused 
with the concept of ‘historical bays’249. This is due to the fact that historic title and rights can 
be applied in several maritime areas, such as the internal waters, territorial sea, straits and 
archipelagos. Hence, a ‘historic title’ is not limited to maritime bays, which is a geographical 
feature and part of a State’s coastal configuration.250 
 
3.2.6.4   Security interests of a coastal State  
In 1945, the Truman Proclamation on the CS was released. It is named after the former US 
President Harry S. Truman. Even though the proclamation was a unilateral action, it rapidly 
gained popularity in State practice across the world. This was partly due to President 
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Truman’s view that every coastal State has the right of self-protection and to guard its shores 
from foreign activities and potential threats.251  
 
The ICJ has raised the question of security in cases concerning maritime delimitations. In the 
1985 ‘Libya/Malta Case’, the ICJ referred to the Truman Proclamation, and stated that 
security interests and concerns of one State can have importance and influence over the 
judgement in cases regarding the delimitation of a maritime border between two States.252 It 
shall be noted that security interests of one State often may be connected, or even be same, to 
the political views of a State’s official administration.253 One relevant legal paradox is that, 
whilst the ICJ does consider security interests to be a ‘special circumstance’ under Article 
15(2) in UNCLOS, it has not recognized the ‘political factor’ as a relevant circumstance in the 
context of the treaty.254  
 
Nonetheless, it may be said that the available case law on this specific area is relatively spars 
and it remains unclear as to what effect ‘security interests’ may have exactly, other than the 
fact that they ‘may’ be relevant for the outcome in cases regarding maritime border 
delimitations.255 
 
3.2.6.5   Navigational interests  
In cases where a State’s coastal configuration produces a small maritime area, due to the 
presence of another State, when applying the principle of equidistance, it may hinder the first-
mentioned State from accessing the CS or the high seas. This issue was raised in the PCA 
‘Croatia/Slovenia Case’ from 2017, where Slovenia claimed that its territorial sea was cut-off, 
due its drastically smaller coastal length, compared with its two neighbours Italy and Croatia. 
The Arbitration Tribunal concluded that Slovenia did in fact have a right, as a coastal State, to 
secure its navigational interests, and thus, the tribunal came forth with a precedent solution, 
where Slovenia was given a navigational corridor, connected to the high seas, across the 
territorial seas of Croatia.256 Navigational interests were also raised in the ‘Eritrea/Yemen 
Case’, and the ‘Guyana/Surinam Case’, but it is generally regarded as a special circumstance 
of minor importance in cases concerning maritime delimitations.257  
 
4   A State’s Maritime Jurisdiction and Sovereignty  
In order to understand why maritime border disputes arise, it is important to specify where 
and under what circumstances they can take place. The legal questions concerning the 
disputes along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, all have one common aspect, which is 
that they largely take place in the maritime space called ‘the territorial sea’. In this chapter, a 
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coastal State’s sovereignty and jurisdictional rights over its territorial sea are examined. 
Thereafter follows a section with focus on the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea and also the legal regime in international straits. In the last pages of this chapter, it 
examines the concept of historical bays and the legal principle ‘Uti possidetis’, which has had 
a significant impact on the outcome of the Croatian/Slovenian Arbitration.  
 
4.1   Territorial Sea  
To understand maritime border delimitations, it is important to understand the concept of the 
maritime area that is called the ‘territorial sea’. In order for a State to have territorial sea of its 
own, it must be a coastal State. In other words, its land territory must at a geographical point 
meet the sea. According to article 3 of UNCLOS, the territorial sea cannot exceed more than 
12 NM from a coastal State’s baseline.258 Baselines are drawn lines that separate a State’s 




Breadth of the territorial sea 
 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this 
Convention.260 
 
In the PCA 1909 ‘Grisbådarna Case’ (Norway v. Sweden), the court found that the territorial 
sea is an addition (appurtenance) of land territory to the coastal State, and as such, it is 
inseparable from the State’s land territory.261 The same cannot be said about other maritime 
spaces, such as the EEZ and the CS.262 Furthermore, according to the dissenting opinion263 of 
Judge Sir Arnold McNair in the ICJ 1951 ‘Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case’ (UK v. 
Norway)264, a coastal State does not have the option to refuse its territorial waters, due to the 
obligations the follow with international law. In his view, the fact that a coastal State 
possesses territorial sea is compulsory and does not depend on the will of the State itself.265 
On the other hand, in the ICJ 1969 ‘North Sea Continental Shelf Case’, the principle ‘land 
dominates the sea’ came into existence. The court found that the coast of a State is the starting 
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point from which the territorial sea is measured. Furthermore, simply by having a coast, a 
State has the right to claim maritime zones.266 
 
As for the breadth of the territorial sea, which is according to article 3, UNCLOS limited to a 
maximum of 12 NM measured from the baseline, it shall be said that a majority of States do 
not exceed the limit set out in the treaty. Today, it is generally agreed that the limit constitutes 
customary international law.267 On the other hand, prior to UNCLOS coming into force, State 
practice showed a variety of breadth for the territorial seas, stretching from 3 NM up to 200 
NM. In general, European coastal States opted for the 3 NM limit. The Nordic Countries 
claimed a 4 NM limit. In South America, coastal States located by the Pacific Ocean, opted 
for a breadth up to 200 NM.268  
 
A coastal State has exclusive and full jurisdiction and sovereignty over its internal and 
territorial waters. Its rights are wide and far-reaching.269 Nonetheless, there are limits as to 
what a coastal State may or may not do under international maritime law. E.g. the ‘right of 
innocent passage’ concerning foreign vessels, through the territorial sea of a coastal State may 
not be restricted.270 Below follows an elaboration of maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty in 
the territorial seas of a coastal State.  
 
4.1.1   Maritime Jurisdiction in the territorial sea 
A State’s right to enact, exercise, execute and enforce national laws over juridical persons, 
nationals and non-nationals within the territorial boundaries of the given State can be 
described as a State’s ‘jurisdiction’.271 However, worth mentioning is that the concept of 
jurisdiction in international law include several definitions, since there are different types of 
jurisdictions that States can or may exercise.272 
 
One of the most cited international law cases concerning ‘State jurisdiction’ is the 1927 PCIJ 
‘Lotus Case’ (France v. Turkey), concerning a ship collision at the high seas, between the 
French mail steamer Lotus, and a Turkish bulk cargo ship, named Boz-Kourt, in which eight 
members of the Turkish crew lost their lives. The case has been used frequently in the 
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international law doctrine.273 By the time the surviving French crew arrived in Constantinople 
(today Istanbul, Turkey), Turkish authorities decided to launch criminal proceedings which 
was met by opposition by France, since the crew were made up by French citizens.274 The 
Turkish and French governments held negotiations, which resulted in an agreement to submit 
the case to the PCIJ to answer the question if Turkey had the right to prosecute the French 
crew. The parties also agreed that the issue would be solved in accordance with the principles 
of international law.275 The PCIJ concluded that a State may not exercise jurisdiction on 
territory belonging to another State. However, the court found that a State is free to exercise 
jurisdiction and enforce its legislation within its territory, regarding suspected civil wrong that 
have taken place elsewhere, under the condition that it is not against international law.276 
According to the ‘objective territoriality principle’, the Boz-Kourt was found to constitute 
Turkish territory. Thus, Turkey did have the right to prosecute French citizens, since the 
deaths of the Turkish crew happened on Turkish territory.277 
 
As for maritime jurisdiction, it shall be noted that there are different maritime spaces, in 
which coastal States can exercise jurisdiction to a varying degree. The internal waters and 
territorial seas are considered to be a part of the coastal State’s territory under international 
law. The two maritime spaces are effectively also the closest to the coastline of the State in 
question, thus, treated equally as the State’s land territory.278 In these two areas, the State has 
the right to exercise its (1) ‘prescriptive’ and (2) ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction. The first reflects 
the power of a State to pass laws and apply them within its territory, whereas the second 
focuses on the State’s right to enforce the legislation over all matters and humans 
(notwithstanding nationality) that find themselves in one of the two maritime spaces.279  
  
4.1.2   Maritime Sovereignty in the territorial sea  
The concept of sovereignty is an attribute of international law, which is related to 
‘jurisdiction’, but they are not the same. A State’s sovereignty may be described as its 
‘supreme authority’ over the territory, within its internationally recognized boundaries.280 In 
the context of international maritime law, Tanaka describes sovereignty as a nation’s 
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extension of its jurisdiction to offshore spaces, which in itself promotes the territorialisation 
of the oceans.281 The territorial sea of a State does not have to be claimed, but is inherent to 
the State’s sovereignty, and through it, the State also have full jurisdiction over this specific 
maritime space.282 Worth mentioning is that other maritime zones, such as the EEZ and CS, 
are not included in a coastal State’s territory, as is the territorial sea. Due to this, a State is not 
granted sovereignty over those areas and thus, may only exercise limited powers.283 
 
A coastal States sovereignty was first defined in the TSC 1958284, which was later 
incorporated and reaffirmed in article 2, UNCLOS 1982 with some modifications. Although, 
it may be said that both provisions were codifications of existing customary maritime law.285 
  
Article 2 
Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and 
subsoil. 
 
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 
2. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed 
and subsoil. 
3. 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and 
to other rules of international law.286 
 
As stated in paragraph 1, a coastal State’s sovereignty is extended over its territorial sea, 
through which it has the full legislative and enforcement jurisdiction. The coastal State can 
regulate and control all activities that take place within its territorial sea and is also given an 
exclusive right to exploit the area in search for natural resources.287 According to paragraph 2, 
a coastal State’s sovereignty over the territorial sea is not just limited to the water, but also 
includes the air space above it, as well as the sea bed and subsoil.288   
 
4.2   Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea  
The right of innocent passage for foreign vessels through the territorial sea of a coastal State 
is protected in UNCLOS. No difference is made between vessels of coastal and land-locked 
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States. This right stem from the historic freedom of the seas, in which navigational rights are 
included.289 One motivating factor for granting this right has been, and still is, to uphold 
international economic trade.290 Furthermore, both international maritime customary law and 
UNCLOS seeks to maintain a reasonable balance between the interests of different States. In 
other words, that a coastal State has the right to exercise sovereignty over its territorial sea, at 
the same time as it does not have the right to suspend navigation of foreign vessels unless 
they pose a security risk.291  
Article 17 
Right of innocent passage 
 
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea.292 
 
Article 17, UNCLOS grants vessels of all States the right of innocent passage across the 
territorial seas of another State. However, a coastal State may suspend the right due to 
security reasons.293 The definition of ‘passage’ is found in article 18 of UNCLOS, and it shall 
also be noted that the right of passage only applies in the territorial seas of a coastal State, and 
not in the internal waters, since they are regarded in the same manner as land territory.294  
 
Article 18 
Meaning of passage 
 
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: 
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. 
 
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and 
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are 
rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to 
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.295 
 
The passage is ‘innocent’ if the traversing is ‘continuous and expeditious’. The speed of the 
vessel shall be adjusted accordingly, in relation to navigational visibility, vessel capacity and 
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safety.296 However, exceptions are made and can be justified in situations that may involve 
elements of ‘force majeure’ or distress. Furthermore, to render assistance to people, vessels or 
aircrafts that find themselves in distress, is also found as a justified ground to pause the 
passage.297 
Article 19 
Meaning of innocent passage 
 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with 
other rules of international law. 
 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following 
activities:298 
 
The definition of ‘innocent passage’ is found in article 19, UNCLOS. It shall be said that as 
long as the passage does not threaten peace, good order or the security of the coastal State, it 
shall be deemed as innocent. However, the second paragraph includes a list of activities that, 
if performed, the passage ceases to be considered as innocent. In such case, the coastal State 
has the right to take appropriate and necessary means to stop the passage299. E.g. fishing 
activities, serious pollution, threats, use of force and weapon exercises are reasons as to why 
the passage could be deemed as ‘non-innocent passage’.300 
 
Under international treaty law, a coastal State can take necessary steps to prevent non-
innocent passage.301 The rights of a coastal State regarding innocent passage of foreign 
vessels are found in articles 21, 23 and 25 of UNCLOS.302 For instance, the coastal State 
holds full legislative powers within its territorial sea, and may adopt laws and regulate 
innocent passage, in accordance with international law.303 Authorities of the coastal State may 
temporarily suspend any passage.304 Additionally, the coastal State holds, under specific 
circumstances, the right criminally persecute a person for crimes committed within its 
territorial sea.305  
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4.2.1   International Straits and Innocent Passage  
In order for vessels to navigate across the seas, they may at some point have to pass through a 
narrow space of water, a strait, which connects two larger maritime spaces. Within 
international maritime law, significant importance has been given to straits that have been or 
still are used for international sea communications.306 The legal situation becomes complex 
when the waters in the strait are narrow enough that they, therefore, constitute territorial seas 
of one or more coastal States.307  
 
In the ICJ 1949 ‘Corfu Channel Case’ (UK v. Albania)308, the circumstances were such, that 
two British warships came under attack by Albanian forces, while passing through the Corfu 
Channel, which in turn is a part of Albania’s territorial sea. The UK claimed that their vessels 
could pass through the strait in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. Albania 
thought otherwise and declared that the warships should have asked for permission in advance 
to pass through the strait. Six months later, two British warships, passing through the strait, 
ran across naval mines in the channel, which resulted in casualties and damages to the ships. 
After the event, the British cleaned the area of mines. The court was tasked with answering 
the question if a foreign vessel had the right of innocent passage through an international 
strait, between two parts of the high seas.309 The court found that, in peacetime, warships of a 
State may traverse through a strait used for international navigation, without authorizations by 
the coastal State, as long as the vessel’s passage itself remains innocent.310 Additionally, the 
court also found that the Corfu Channel, in fact, constituted an important international 
maritime highway, through which international traffic could not be hindered.311 Such 
reasoning was later reflected in article 16(4), TSC 1958, which states that foreign vessels 
enjoy the right on ‘non-suspendable passage’ through straits used for international navigation, 
between the two parts of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.312  
 
In UNCLOS, the right of ‘innocent passage’ through straits used for international navigation 
from the territorial sea of one State, to the high seas/EEZ is found in article 45(1b).313 Foreign 
vessels enjoy ‘non-suspendable innocent passage’ through straits that constitute territorial 
waters of another coastal State.314 
                                                
306 Tanaka 116.  
307 Ruth Lapidoth, ’International Straits’ (July 2018) in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedias of 
International Law (online edn) para 1 (Henceforth ‘Lapidoth’) 
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1226?prd=EPIL> 
accessed 16 November 2020.  
308 ’Corfu Channel Case’ (UK v. Albania) (Judgement) [1949] ICJ Rep.  
309 Lapidoth, para 2.  
310 ’Corfu Channel Case’ (UK v. Albania) (Judgement) [1949] ICJ Rep 28.  
311 Ibid 29; Rothwell, Stephens 247.  
312 TSC 1958 article 16(4).  
313 UNCLOS article 45(1)(b).  
314 UNCLOS article 45(2); Tanaka 129–130.  
	 49	
 
4.2.2   Historical Bays and Bays shared by more than one State 
There are no definitions of what a ‘historical bay’ is, neither in the TSC 1958, nor in 
UNCLOS 1982.315 However, a reference can be found in UNCLOS, although it does not 
provide any further elaborations of the concept.316 Thus, in order to find an explanation as to 
what ‘historical bays’ are, one needs to turn to international case law. To start, guidance can 
be found in the dissenting opinion317 of ICJ Judge Shigeru Oda in the 1992 ‘Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute Case’ (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua). According to Oda, 
waters that hold ‘bay-like features’, but do not necessarily qualify for the status of a legal 
‘bay’, may still be considered as such, if a State can provide historical reasons and 
justifications as to why the ‘bay-like feature’ should be internationally viewed as a bay.318  
 
Due to the absence of a treaty-based definition of ‘historical reasons’, with customary 
international law providing sparse examples, the UN Secretariat has provided some guidance 
on this particular area in its study ‘Juridical Regime of Historic waters including historic 
bays’.319 The Secretariat identified three ‘elements’ of title to historic waters. They are the 
following: (1) the exercise of authority over the area by the State claiming historic rights; (2) 
the continuity of this exercise of authority; (3) the attitude of foreign States (State practice).320 
Generally, due to a variety of claims in areas with unique geographical features, the 
assessment of whether a bay is ‘historic’ or not, is dealt with a case-by-case approach by 
international courts.321 If States are able to provide convincing evidence, in accordance with 
the elements described above, the waters will be considered as ‘historic’ and will be treated as 
a part of the internal waters of the coastal State.322 
 
In modern times, there has been an increase of cases which have resulted in the peculiar 
situation where a border between two or more States is drawn across bays. The reason behind 
this is in part due to decolonization of States and the break-up of former States.323 In the ICJ 
1992 ‘El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua Case’, it was concluded by the ICJ that the Gulf 
of Fonseca was to be considered as a ‘historical bay’, despite that it was bordered by all three 
States. Thus, the bay fell under the sovereignty of the three mentioned States.324 Equally, the 
Arbitration Tribunal in the 2017 ‘Croatia/Slovenia Arbitration’ found that the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija previously constituted internal waters of the SFRY, but due to dissolution, an 
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international border ran across the bay. Even though it was considered as a ‘historical bay’, a 
border delimitation had to be made, since two States cannot exercise sovereignty over the 
same maritime area. The delimitation was made in accordance with the principle of ‘Uti 
Possidetis’, based on the actual border situation at the day of independence of the two 
States.325 
 
4.3   Uti Possidetis 
The doctrine of ‘Uti Possidetis’ can, historically, be traced back to Roman law, in which it 
was used as a legal method to determine territorial changes after an armed conflict. Peace 
treaties were signed in accordance with the actual territorial possessions at the time the 
conflict ended.326 The historical use of the principle is no longer feasible, since territorial 
acquisition through the use of force is prohibited under the UN Charter327, and would pose a 
violation of the same.328 The modern interpretation of the principle can be found in the 
process of decolonization in Africa and South America. In 1964, the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), which existed between 1963 and 2002, after which it was replaced by the 
African Union (AU)329, adopted a resolution in which the member States agreed to respect the 
State borders that already existed between their nations at the time of independence from their 
former colonial powers.330 
 
The ICJ held in the 1986 ‘Frontier Dispute Case’ (Burkina Faso v. Mali), that the principle, 
indeed, saw widespread application during the decolonization process in South America331, 
and that it was a general principle of international law, closely connected with States’ 
declarations of independence. Thus, Uti Possidetis was equally applicable in cases concerning 
border disputes in Africa, as it was in South America, since the core of the principle was to 
avoid provoking instability in the States that gained independence post-colonization.332 
Furthermore, the European Community held in the 1991 ‘EC Arbitration Commission on 
Yugoslavia’ (Badinter Commission)333, that the boundaries between the newly independent 
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States in the Balkans would remain the same and follow the old boundaries, which already 
existed between the republics within the former SFRY.334 Similar reasoning was held in the 
process of dissolution of former Czechoslovakia in 1993, i.e. the borders between the two 
independent States would remain the same as in the time of the federation.335 
 
The doctrine of Uti possidetis has reached widespread acceptance within the domain of 
international law and even though the use of the principle saw its starting point in the 
decolonization process in Africa and South America, it is today equally applicable in cases 
concerning dissolutions of federal States.336  
 
4.4   Summary  
The reasons and motivating factors behind maritime border delimitations, and as to why they 
occur are many. Historically, the process has been triggered either through decolonisation or 
through the dissolution of former States. Moreover, States often tend to have opposing 
interests, due to different coastal configurations, State interests and interpretations of existing 
treaty law. As for international law, it shall be said that the International Community has tried 
to codify maritime customary law both through the TSC 1958 and UNCLOS 1982. As for 
international court proceedings, courts have generally taken a ‘case-by-case’ approach, since 
every maritime dispute features a variety of factors that need to be considered. This approach 
has given rise to several different ‘special circumstances’, which the courts have had to 
assess. The result has proven to be rather diverse. Thus, it is hard to say that a previous 
solution to a dispute can be applicable in a future case. Moreover, a common feature found in 
existing case law is that coastal States tend to have overlapping claims across different 
maritime spaces. This further complicates the matter, since States are granted different rights 
and powers in different maritime zones, according to treaty law. Due to the ‘territorialisation’ 
of the internal and territorial waters, coastal States are granted both jurisdiction and 
sovereignty in these areas. Thus, the courts have had to balance the interests and rights of 
coastal States with the international framework and regulations for maritime activity, as well 
as the interests of other coastal and non-coastal States.   
 
5   Final solutions to the disputed maritime borders in the Adriatic Sea  
This chapter connects all previous chapters in order to analyse the essence of the thesis. The 
chapter is divided into three subsections, in which the research question is answered by the 
end of each subsection. The first section analyses the outcome and reasoning behind the PCA 
Final Award (2017) in the Croatia-Slovenia maritime border dispute, which Croatia has 
consistently refused to accept. Afterwhich, an answer to the first research question is 
presented. The following two subsections differ from the first, since the disputes are yet to be 
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resolved. In the second part, the legality of the on-going construction of the Peljesac Bridge is 
discussed and analysed. Moreover, the unsettled maritime border between Croatia and BiH is 
elaborated and the answer of the research question also includes plausible outcomes of the 
dispute between the two neighbouring States. The third and also last subsection analyses the 
issues with the current legal regime at the entrance of the Bay of Kotor, which is part of the 
wider dispute between Croatia and Montenegro. Also, the future delimitation between the 
territorial seas of the two States is discussed and the section ends with the answer to the last 
research question.  
  
5.1   How should a final maritime border delimitation be drawn in the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija and in the Northern Adriatic? 
In order to answer the question as to how the maritime border between Croatia and Slovenia 
should be drawn, it is important to bear in mind that the dispute has been assessed by the 
PCA, through the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal, with a final award being presented in 2017. 
Nonetheless, Croatia has objected implementation of the final award, whereas Slovenia has 
found its outcome as sufficient.337  
 
5.1.1   Bay of Piran/Savudrija  
5.1.1.1   Internal waters or not 
As for applicable law, the PCA applied article 15, UNCLOS in the matter of the delimitation 
in the Bay of Piran. The analysis above has shown that the tribunal has taken into 
consideration claims of both parties. The first issue to resolve was whether or not the bay 
constituted ‘internal waters’ prior to the dissolution of the SFRY, since Slovenia claimed that 
it was the case. Croatia, on the other hand, did not agree to this. The tribunal had to analyse 
the status of the bay prior to 1991, and found that the SFRY declared the bay to be internal 
waters of that state in 1987.338 It shall be said that the tribunal based the reasoning from the 
‘Gulf of Fonseca Case’ from 1992, where the ICJ found that a bay does not lose its status 
simply because a state ceases to exist.  
 
An interesting aspect of the final award, is the analysis of the conduct of the two States within 
the bay, both prior and after independence. The Slovene coast has historically been more 
attached to the bay, with a significant population occupying the shores, whereas the Croatian 
side was largely seen as deserted. Nonetheless, the tribunal did not give much attention to the 
fact that the populations on both sides of the border depended on fishing activities within the 
bay, both before and after 1991. It did however, take into account that the Slovene side did 
install a marine scientific research station after independence, and that the activities it 
performed were never questioned by any official institution of Croatia. Thus, it can be said 
that Croatia and its institutions remained passive in the area of the bay, and did not give 
enough attention that Slovenia was de facto having sole control over the bay post-
independence. Croatia seems to have simply relied on the belief that half the bay was a part of 
the Croatian maritime territory. While Croatia does in fact, due to its long coastline, hold a 
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significantly larger proportion of the Adriatic Sea, it did in one way neglect the very northern 
part of its maritime border. The result was that the claims of Croatia could not be interpreted 
as convincing enough, when compared to the claims of Slovenia.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to mention that each maritime dispute is unique and different 
from any previous case, and the situation in Bay of Piran concerns, partly, also the 
delimitation of internal waters, which has never been tried by an international court. Since the 
internal waters of a coastal State is treated equally as land territory, two states cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over the same area. The reasoning of the tribunal may be seen as a new precedent, 
since maritime delimitations, in treaty law (i.e. UNCLOS) only refers to the territorial sea and 
not the internal waters. Hence, the tribunal was not able to make reference to the provisions of 
the convention, but it did use the same methodology that is used in cases concerning maritime 
border delimitations of the territorial sea339. However, the delimitation was made in light of 
the actual situation at the day of independence of the both States from the SFRY in 1991, i.e. 
in accordance with the principle of Uti Possidetis.  
 
5.1.1.2   Maritime Border Delimitation within the Bay  
As for the delimitation of the territorial sea between the two States, they had completely 
different interpretations of UNCLOS, article 15. Croatia heavily relied on the first paragraph 
which states that delimitations are to be made in accordance with the principle of 
equidistance. An equidistance line would have been very positive for Croatia, since it would 
have provided a much larger proportion of the bay, nearing a fifty-fifty delimitation. Slovenia 
on the other hand, did not have much to gain if it simply would have accepted the primary 
equidistance line. Being already ‘boxed-in’ between the territorial seas of Italy and Croatia, it 
needed to provide the tribunal with evidence to support its claims over the bay. In order to do 
so, Slovenia leaned on the second paragraph of article 15 in UNCLOS, which states that the 
equidistance line cannot be applied in bays that have a historical title and/or relevant 
circumstances attached to the case340.  
 
The tribunal found Slovenia’s claims as convincing enough, in relation to the submitted 
evidence in this particular matter. One interesting aspect of the dispute is the presence of a 
marine biology station on the Slovenian side. The institute had conducted marine scientific 
research in the bay and surrounding area, without objection from Croatia, despite the 
awareness of it. Slovenia has also de facto exercised jurisdiction within the bay, since 1991, 
also without any significant opposition from Croatia. Furthermore, on the Slovene side of the 
border, significant population exists, whereas the Croatian side is sparsely populated, with a 
small group of fishermen active in and around the bay. It may be said that Croatia’s inactivity 
and small interest in the bay, in the years leading up to the arbitration turned out to have 
negative consequences, since the representatives were not in the position to present any 
special circumstances which would turn the final verdict in favour of Croatia.  
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When analysing the special and relevant circumstances, it shall be said that the tribunal’s take 
on the coastal configuration of the two States, would heavily benefit Croatia, should a plain 
equidistance line be applied. But to the fact that Croatia had not engaged in any major activity 
within the bay, and within its proximity, it would have resulted in an inequitable delimitation 
for the Slovene side. Parallels can be drawn with the ICJ 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
Case, where it was found that maritime border delimitations must be balanced between States 
that have different coastal configurations. Indeed, Slovenia’s coast is concave (inward-going), 
whilst Croatia’s is convex (outward-going). Thus, Croatia would gain more, and Slovenia less 
maritime territory, through the application of an equidistance line. But as mentioned, only 
assessing the coastal configuration does not always produce a proportionate result. Should the 
tribunal not have made adjustments to the primary equidistance line, Slovenia’s maritime 
territory would have been ‘boxed-in’ or ‘cut-off’ from the high seas, due to the ‘sandwich-
effect’341. Thus, the tribunal managed to reach a more equitable solution and through this 
uphold reasoning from previous case law.  
  
Nonetheless, it shall be pointed out that the tribunal’s approach to the maritime delimitation 
dispute between the two States is somewhat unclear, in relation to the ICJ 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case. The latter concerned the delimitation of a CS and not the territorial 
sea, which is the case in the Slovenian-Croatian dispute. The tribunal found that natural 
prolongation can also be applied in cases regarding the territorial sea342. No further 
explanation as to why this is can be found in the final award. Also, international maritime law 
states that a continental shelf constitutes a natural prolongation of the land territory343. 
However, the territorial sea is inherent to a sovereign State due to it having a coast344. Even 
though dispute settlement mechanisms do not have to refer only to international treaty law, 
but also to case law, it remains unclear if ‘natural prolongation’ can be applied to the 
territorial sea or not. No international principle does explicitly say so and the reason for this is 
most likely due to the fact that there are clear provisions and rules on how the territorial sea is 
to be measured and delimited. Furthermore, case law after the North Sea Continental Shelf 
does not provide any aid on the matter either. No indications can be found as to if the right to 
a territorial sea of a State is explicitly due to natural prolongation.  
 
In the view of Dr Robin Cleverly345, member of the Slovenian team during the arbitration, 
believes that the outcome of the delimitation within the bay was balanced. In his view, 
Slovenia’s claim for full sovereignty over the whole Bay of Piran, was not tenable. Equally, 
Croatia’s claim for a fifty-fifty delimitation of the bay was also not reasonable, since the 
special circumstances of Slovenia were much convincing in the tribunal’s view. 
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In conclusion, the two States did rely on article 15 of UNCLOS, but on different paragraphs. 
Croatia insisted on the use of an equidistance line, with no regard to any special 
circumstances, most likely due to a lack of any that would strengthen its claims. Slovenia on 
the other hand, successfully managed to present several circumstances which the tribunal took 
into account. It became evident that the land area was of significant importance to many 
Slovene citizens living in the area, and the State as a whole. Also, the fact that Croatia 
remained passive in exercising any activities and powers in the area both pre- and post-
independence, seems to have had a negative effect in the final award for Croatia.  
 
5.1.2   A Maritime Junction to the High Seas  
An interesting aspect in the final award, was the fact that the tribunal did grant Slovenia a 
maritime junction from its territorial sea to the high seas, across the maritime space of 
Croatia, due to navigational interests. This is a unique precedent346, since such interests of a 
State have received relatively little importance in previous case law. However, this precedent 
should be considered as controversial. The answer as to why Slovenia has wanted a maritime 
junction to the high seas, can be found in the history of the two States post-independence. 
Slovenia left the SFRY relatively intact, whereas Croatia was drawn into an independence 
war (1991-1995). Slovenia also managed to integrate into the European-Atlantic Cooperation 
much quicker than Croatia. Hence, it may be said that the concerns of Slovenia, i.e. its 
navigational, security and economic interests were, to some extent, endangered and subject to 
rules and regulations imposed by Croatian authorities. However, both States were members of 
both the EU and NATO throughout the duration of the proceedings at the PCA. Over the past 
decades, the issues that Slovenia faced post-independence have greatly diminished, since the 
security risks in the area are to be considered as low. In general, the bilateral relations are 
considered as friendly between the two nations, citizens of both States hold good relations and 
they also share a common history and struggle for independence347. Therefore, the fact that 
Slovenia was granted a maritime junction to the high seas should not be considered as straight 
forward, since vessels would still have enjoyed the right of innocent passage through Croatian 
territorial waters.  
 
It shall be pointed out that in the Drnovšek-Račan Agreement348, the two States agreed that 
Slovenia would be granted a corridor to the high seas.349 However, the agreement was never 
ratified by Croatia, and the status and existence of the ‘junction’ remained unclear until the 
final award by the Arbitration Tribunal. In general, the fact that Slovenia was granted a 
connection between its territorial sea and the high seas does not differ significantly from the 
rights it held prior to the award. Slovenian-flagged vessels still enjoyed the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial waters of Croatia. Nonetheless, the principle of innocent 
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passage can, in many ways, be considered as ‘the right of a controlled passage’, since vessels 
have to comply with the regulations of the coastal State. Due to the junction, Slovenian 
vessels are no longer subject to regulations and legal regimes of Croatia, and thus, it has 
complete freedom of navigation and communication to and from the high seas.    
  
5.1.3   The EU aspect   
Since Croatia has resisted to implement the outcome of the Arbitration Tribunal, the border 
dispute is still on-going. Slovenia submitted a complaint to the CJEU in 2018 due to the issue. 
However, it shall be said that the actions of the European Commission did not go unnoticed. 
The then-President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said that the conflict was a 
‘European problem’ and not just a dispute between two member States. Six months later, the 
EU announced that it would remain neutral in the issue. The drastic turn was criticized, since 
there is a belief that the dispute had become too politicized.350  
 
Some words need to be said regarding the unwillingness of the EU to settle the issue. The 
CJEU primary focus is to interpret EU law351, and the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal of the PCA 
is not a body of the EU. In general, the EU and the CJEU are not, and do not consider 
themselves to be a dispute settlement mechanism (i.e. international courts), in that sense that 
they can decide in cases concerning international maritime law. The European Commission 
decided to remain neutral on the issue. Such a reasoning should be welcoming, since the 
dispute is between two member States. It would be highly controversial to see an institutional 
body of the EU decide in the matter, since it could potentially be seen as if the Union is taking 
a stand and showing support for one member State and not the other. It could potentially harm 
the reputation of the EU within the international community and also among the citizens of 
the EU in the member States. However, even though this is a more political aspect than it is 
legal, it seems as if the Commission did not know how to address the issue properly, which 
resulted in the contradicting statements by the then-President of the Commission. 
Nonetheless, the dispute itself is not unsolvable through legal means and/or bilateral 
agreements, but it seems to be a question that is rather politically and emotionally charged for 
both Slovenia and Croatia.  
 
5.1.4   Answer to the first research question 
It may be said that neither State received what they claimed in the arbitration, when the PCA 
Final Award was finally presented. Slovenia did claim full sovereignty over the bay, whereas 
Croatia claimed a fifty-fifty split. The tribunal followed the ‘three-step approach’, previously 
applied in cases concerning maritime border delimitations. To this, a primary equidistance 
line within the Bay of Piran was drawn, followed by the assessment of the special 
circumstances provided by the two parties. As for the PCA Final Award itself, there are some 
controversies that surround the outcome. It shall be said that international law is not always as 
waterproof as national legislation is. Hence, these gaps within international law are usually to 
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be solved in light of available treaties, previous case law and doctrine. The fact that 
controversial remarks can be found, the tribunal seems to have largely relied on previous 
State practice of the two States in question. 
 
A clear example in the Arbitration Tribunal’s Final Award can be found in the fact that it 
remained rather consistent to the bilateral 2001 Drnovšek-Račan Agreement, signed by the 
two States. The fact that the Croatian Parliament decided not to ratify the agreement, did not 
mean that the provisions of it were not implemented. On the contrary, the regime leading up 
to the arbitration was very much in line with the provisions of the mentioned agreement. A 
clear example of this is that the legal regime within the Bay of Piran and Slovenia’s right to 
access the high seas from its territorial sea was not endangered nor prevented by Croatia in 
the time between 2001 and 2017.  
 
The main issue that remains is to find a suitable solution for both States. The analysis has 
shown that the main issue for Croatia has been the work and scandals that emerged during the 
hearings of the Arbitration Tribunal, and not necessarily the results found in the Final Award. 
Article 15 of UNCLOS has been interpreted differently by the two States. Croatia’s claim that 
the principle of equidistance is the primary rule is faulty and not tenable. Indeed, the principle 
itself is the starting point in any case concerning maritime delimitation disputes. But previous 
case law has shown that there are many special and relevant circumstances that the courts 
have accepted as valid claims. Hence, the outcome of the Final Award is, in large, 
understandable, and in line with international maritime doctrine.  
 
In conclusion, Croatia’s actions both regarding 2001 Drnovšek-Račan Agreement and 2017 
Final Award by the Arbitration Tribunal, might lead to more harm than good, due to the risk 
that Croatia could potentially be considered as an unreliable partner on the international stage. 
As for the question of a permanent solution for the border delimitation, even though the Final 
Award did not change much in respect to the actual legal regime that had been taking place 
within the bay, Croatia does not have much ground to argue a different outcome within the 
bay itself, since the principle of equidistance does not result in equitable proportions for 
Slovenia, which is much more dependent on the bay. As for the use of the maritime junction, 
which Slovenia was granted across the territorial seas of Croatia, it shall be said that the area 
itself still is regarded as a part of Croatia’s maritime space. Slovenia may only use it for the 
sake of freedom of navigation and communication, and it does not hold any other rights that 
come with sovereignty, such as the right of exploration and exploitation in the area.  
 
There are no indications that Croatia would change its position in the current matter. It will 
hold firm to their position that the tribunal’s judgement is invalid and the issue will most 
likely have to be raised in the future. A bilateral agreement between the two States could 
bring a final settlement and its content would very much have to be in line with the Final 
Award. Croatia has not officially opposed the actual border delimitation as such, but one 
major issue for both States are the rights of the fisheries on both sides of the border. There is a 
possibility that a joint management area could be set up, in which fishing activities could be 
conducted by parties from both States. Such reasoning has been accepted by international 
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courts and constitute customary law, thanks to the 1993 ‘Greenland/Jan Mayen Case’352. For 
Slovenia, that would result in a concession, but it would most likely be in the interest of both 
States, to maintain good neighbourly relations, which in general, are very good today. 
 
5.2   Does Croatia violate the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a maritime state, to 
access the high seas through its construction of the Peljesac Bridge? 
The maritime border dispute between BiH and Croatia, has not been brought before an 
arbitration tribunal, as was the case with the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. The 
dispute has been on-going since the independence of the two States from the SFRY. In 1999, 
the Neum Agreement, signed by the former presidents of the two States, aimed to resolve the 
main problems in connection with the dispute and establish a legal regime in the area which 
would be suitable for both sides. However, since neither State managed to ratify the 
agreement, the legal framework within the area remains unclear on many accounts. 
Nonetheless, it shall be said that the agreement and its provisions, in general, are largely 
applied in this part of the Adriatic Sea.353 
 
5.2.1   Maritime Border Delimitation in the Channel of Mali Ston   
The main problem for the BiH side is that the border with Croatia in the Channel of Mali 
Ston, has never been fully settled. In the 1999 Neum Agreement, the both sides agreed on a 
proposed future border.354 But since the agreement failed to be ratified by both States, it is not 
possible to determine exactly how the official border runs.  
 
5.2.1.1   The Tip of the Klek Peninsula  
The dispute is not in its entirety a maritime dispute, since it also concerns the delimitation of 
the land territory, namely on the Klek Peninsula.355 The Croatian Dubrovnik-Neretva County 
claims the tips of the Klek Peninsula, due to historic reasons. However, even if this claim was 
one of the reasons the Croatian Parliament chose not to ratify the treaty, it should not be 
considered as a claim of the Republic of Croatia. The State itself has never claimed the tip to 
be a part of its territory, at the same time as BiH (both prior- and post-independence) has had 
de facto and de jure control over the whole peninsula. This is also shown in the ‘Act on State 
Survey and Real Estate Cadastre’, set up in 1974 by the SFRY. In practice, if Croatia would 
claim the tip, as per request of one of its counties, it would still not have any major use of it. It 
would be a completely isolated land territory of Croatia, and it would still only be accessible 
by road through BiH territory. Therefore, it is reasonable and also suitable to believe that 
Croatia will never officially claim the tip, since it would be a breach of its own State practice.  
 
                                                
352 Section 3.2.6.1, ‘Economic Factors’.  
353 Section 2.3.1, ‘Neum Agreement’; Section 2.3.4, ‘Aftermath and legal situation post-1999’.	
354 See ‘Appendix 4’.  
355 Section 2.3.2, ‘Klek Peninsula’.  
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Furthermore, the Badinter Commission, set up by the EC in 1991356, concluded in ‘Opinion 3’ 
that the borders357 between the former socialist States would remain the same now that they 
were independent, in accordance with the principle of Uti Possidetis. Croatia relied on the 
Badinter Commission’s report during the Independence War (1991-1995) to justify its right to 
the whole territory that once constituted the Socialist Republic of Croatia. Hence, the land 
borders have very much remained the same post-independence. Any changes to the land 
borders can only be done through bilateral agreements between relevant States. If Croatia was 
to officially claim the tip of the Klek Peninsula, it could have other implications for this State, 
for instance along its eastern border with Serbia along the Danube River. Governments (both 
former and present) of Croatia have been very much aware of this. Hence, it is unreasonable, 
in the context of the Croatian Constitution358, to believe that the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Croatia would be endangered, since Croatia’s official position has been that the 
whole Klek Peninsula is a part of BiH.  
 
In conclusion, it may be said that any potential claims of the Republic of Croatia related to the 
peninsula would, with great certainty, not be accepted by any international court. The main 
reason is that BiH has had the de facto and de jure control over the whole peninsula, and such 
a claim would be in breach of the Badinter Commission and the principle of Uti Possidetis.  
 
5.2.1.2   The status of the Veliki and Mali Školj islets? 
As for the two islets in the Channel of Mali Ston359, the SFRY ‘Act on State Survey and Real 
Estate Cadastre’ declared them to be a part of the then-Socialist Republic of BiH. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the issue concerning the tip of the Klek Peninsula, Croatia is 
unofficially claiming360 the two as a part of Croatian territory. In the Neum Agreement, it was 
decided that the maritime border between the two States would be drawn in accordance with 
the principle of equidistance361. Such delimitation resulted in the two islets falling within the 
                                                
356 Section 2.3.1, ’Neum Agreement’; Section 4.3, ’Uti Possidetis’.  
357 As for the term ’border’, in the context of the Badinter Commission, it shall be noted that the Commission 
stated in ‘Opinion 3’ that the borders would remain the same. However, even if the land borders between the 
socialist republics were clearly defined during the rule of the SFRY, the maritime borders between them were 
never defined by the State. Hence, all maritime areas, adjacent to the coast of then-Socialist Republics Slovenia, 
Croatia, BiH and Montenegro, were considered as Yugoslav internal and territorial waters. Therefore, 
sovereignty over the maritime areas rested with the State itself and not with the socialist republics. 
358 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia article 2.		
359 Section 2.3.3, ‘Veliki and Mali Školj’.  
360 It shall be noted that the claims of Croatia concerning the two islets have not been straight forward. They are 
uninhabited and do hold any permanent population. Geographically, they are much closer to BiH, and according 
to the provisional equidistance line, drawn in the negotiations leading to the Neum Agreement (1999), they are 
also located within the territorial sea of BiH. Objections were raised by the Croatian Dubrovnik-Neretva County, 
which claim the islets to be Croatian. Hence, official bodies and institutions of the Republic of Croatia have 
claimed the islets. However, no Government of Croatia has, thus far, officially declared if the State claims the 
islets or not. Therefore, the conclusion that may be drawn is that it is an domestic matter which Croatia will have 
to declare its position in the future.  
361 Section 3.2.3, ‘The Principle of Equidistance’.  
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territorial sea of BiH. The islets are in the ownership of a Croat family, who are citizens of 
BiH362. In their view, the islets constitute the territory of BiH.  
 
The status of the islets, as to which State they belong to is an important question, since it 
would determine how the maritime border would be drawn between the two States. In the 
1999 Neum Agreement, the provisional equidistance line was drawn as a median line across 
the Channel of Mali Ston, between the mainland of Croatia and BiH. However, if Croatia was 
to officially declare a claim over the Veliki and Mali Školj, it could potentially change the 
current equidistance line, since they would fall within the internal waters of Croatia. Thus, the 
maritime border would run very close to the coast of BiH, since it would have to be drawn 
between the islets and the Klek Peninsula, and not in the middle of the Channel of Mali Ston.  
 
It is important to note that in the 1999 Neum Agreement, it was decided that the islets would 
be given ‘no-effect’.363 Hence, they do not generate any additional territorial sea for BiH364. 
This is in line with UNCLOS, since the islets do not, and cannot sustain any economic life of 
its own, nor any human habitation.365 Even though they are a natural formation, surrounded 
by waters, they would most likely be considered as ‘rocks’.366 Hence, the delimitation made 
in 1999, can be considered to be in line with previous case law, i.e. the ICJ 1999 
‘Eritrea/Yemen Case’ and the ICJ 1985 ‘Libya/Malta Case’.  
 
Croatia’s unofficial stance could be interpreted as if it would like to wait for the proper time 
to define the status of the Veliki and Mali Školj. By neither officially claiming them, nor 
declaring them as BiH territory, it could give Croatia a better starting point in future 
negotiations as to whom the islets should belong to. Nonetheless, BiH has consistently 
considered them to be a part of its territory and it is a historical fact that they were recognized 
as such both according to the 1974 SFRY cadastre and the current BiH cadaster. Hence, it will 
not be tenable for Croatia to then claim the islets, since it would very much go against the 
principle of Uti Possidetis and the Badinter Commission’s Report which are of crucial 
importance for this State. In such case, Croatia would have to present sufficient and 
convincing evidence that special circumstances exist, and as for now, the chances of any 
available can be considered as none. Whereas for BiH, which has held the de facto and de 
jure control over the islets, at the same time as the owners of them consider that all historic 
                                                
362 Zoran Šagolj, ‘Vlasnik spornih otoka u Malostonskom zaljevu: Mi jesmo Hrvati, ali Mali i Veliki školj 
pripadaju BiH. Dubrovačka republika to je područje prodala za svoju slobodu Turcima, a naši preci su ga kupili’ 
(Slobodna Dalmacija, 9 July 2017) <https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/vlasnik-spornih-otoka-u-
malostonskom-zaljevu-mi-jesmo-hrvati-ali-mali-i-veliki-skolj-pripadaju-bih-dubrovacka-republika-to-je-
podrucje-prodala-za-svoju-slobodu-turcima-a-nasi-preci-su-ga-kupili-495874> accessed 27 November 2020. The 
Putica family are the officially the owners of the two islets, and they are Croat citizens of BiH. In their view, the islets are 
part of the BiH, since their ancestors bought the land during the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire. They agree that the islets 
were written in the SFRY Cadastre as a part of the Čapljina Municipality, Socialist Republic of BiH in 1974. 
363 Section 3.2.5.4, ‘Presence of islands’.  
364 The islets are not visible in ‘Appendix 4’, but it is possible to see that the equidistance line is drawn straight 
across the Channel of Mali Ston, with no regard to other marine features.  
365 UNCLOS article 121(3).  
366 UNCLOS article 121(1).  
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documentation shows that the two Školjs should belong to BiH, it may be said that they 
would in any case fall into the possessions of this State.  
  
5.2.2   Peljesac Bridge and the water under it 
In recent years, the on-going construction of the Croatian Peljesac Bridge367 has been a major 
issue for the bilateral relations between the two States. Croatia claims that the construction is 
an infrastructural project of national importance, which it frankly is, since it aims to connect 
two parts of Croatian land territory that are separated by BiH territory. On the other hand, 
since the maritime border in the Channel of Mali Ston is not defined, BiH claims that the two 
States need to address the issue first before Croatia can build the bridge.  
 
According to Croatia, one major motivating factor for the construction of the bridge, are the 
provisions of the 1999 Neum Agreement, which aimed to allow undisturbed flow of traffic to 
and from the two parts of Croatia via BiH. However, this specific provision has never been 
implemented, since border control is still exercised. The geo-political situation has also 
changed, since Croatia has become a member of the EU, which BiH is not. The 
implementation of EU border regulations has led to significantly more time-consuming border 
checks, especially during touristic seasons, which adds up traffic congestions in the area. The 
construction of the bridge would bypass BiH territory, and road travel between two parts of 
Croatia would not be subject to border regulations.  
   
However, every vessel going to and from Neum, BiH, would have to pass under the bridge, 
which requires certain infrastructural characteristics in order to avoid a ‘cut-off’ effect for 
BiH. Currently, the height of the bridge is set to be 55 m, which would allow a variety of 
vessel sizes to pass under it. Furthermore, Croatia also argues that the bridge is being built 
completely within Croatian territory. BiH argues that the waters that flow under the bridge are 
not defined as to whom they belong and that Croatia’s claims cannot be tenable until the two 
sides agree on a final maritime border delimitation.  
 
Treaty law, i.e. UNCLOS, does not provide one specific and binding rule as to how a 
maritime border delimitation can be done between the territorial seas of two states. On the 
contrary, there are several options that need to be interpreted.368 Article 15(1) sets out that a 
median equidistance line shall be drawn across a body of water, but the second paragraph of 
the same article sets out that the principle of equidistance shall not be applied if special 
circumstances are available. For special circumstances, previous case law provide some 
interesting aspects and guidance that could be applied in the Channel of Mali Ston. The 
Arbitration Tribunal concluded in the ‘Slovenia/Croatia Case’ from 2017, with inspiration 
from the 1969 ‘North Sea Continental Shelf Case’, that for navigational interests369, the 
territorial sea of one State can be naturally prolonged in such way that it connects to the high 
                                                
367 Section 2.3.5, ‘Peljesac Bridge’.		
368 Section 3.2.3, ‘The Principle of Equidistance’. 
369 Section 3.2.6.5, ‘Navigational Interests’.  
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seas370. However, even though the Slovenia/Croatia Case is a precedence, it is not necessarily 
considered as international customary law. Furthermore, the geographical features are 
different in the area of Neum. They are different to the extent that BiH can be considered as a 
geographically disadvantaged State371, since its territorial sea is located deep within what 
Croatia has declared to be its internal waters.  
  
Frankly, the bridge is a relatively normal infrastructural project, regulated within national 
legislation and Croatia does have the right to connect its territories though the project. A 
similar case can be found in Scandinavia, where the Danish-Swedish Øresund Bridge and the 
Danish Great Belt Fixed Link across the Danish straits, encloses the Baltic Sea from the North 
Sea.372 The construction of the Great Belt Fixed Link was opposed by Finland, however, it 
was never tried in an international court since the two States resolved the matter through a 
bilateral agreement373. A bilateral agreement between BiH and Croatia could resolve the 
matter, in which the rights of BiH as a coastal State, could be settled by ensuring that BiH’s 
navigation and communication interests are secured. Nonetheless, any agreement would also 
have to address the question as to which State the waters below the bridge belong to.  
 
5.2.3   Croatia’s use of straight baselines  
Croatia uses a system of straight baselines374, due to the presence of many islands and 
irregularities in its coast line. Coastal States may use either normal or straight baselines, or a 
combination of both. However, it is possible to assume that Croatia has applied straight 
baselines in breach of international maritime law. The maritime area between the baseline and 
the coast of Croatia constitute internal waters. According to UNCLOS, article 7(6), a coastal 
State’s use of straight baselines may not cut-off the territorial sea of another coastal State. 
Hence, by declaring the waters in the Channel of Mali Ston as Croatian internal waters, the 
only sea exit to international waters is cut off for BiH.  
 
In a legal context, this status which Croatia grants its waters can be viewed as problematic. 
The freedom of innocent passage is only applicable in the territorial waters of a coastal State. 
However, through the use of straight baselines, by default, a vessel en route to Neum, BiH, 
must pass through the internal waters of Croatia where the principle of innocent passage does 
not have to be tolerated. Therefore, it may be said that the rights of BiH, as a coastal State, are 
being limited by Croatia.  
                                                
370 Section 2.2.3, ‘The Arbitration Tribunal’s Final Award’.  
371 ’Geographically disadvantaged States’ are those States that can be considered as to having an unfavourable 
geographical position when compared to e.g. its neighbours. In the case of BiH, its territorial sea is located deep 
within the proclaimed internal waters of Croatia. Hence, the access to international waters from BiH is 
dependant of the legal regime in both the internal and territorial waters of Croatia.  
372 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Passage through the Great Belt Case (Finland v Denmark)’ (December 2006) in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law (online edn) 
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e193> accessed 27 
November 2020. 
373 Tanaka 130.  
374 Section 2.3.4, ‘Aftermath and legal situation post-1999’.  
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There are similarities between this dispute and the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. 
Slovenia’s territorial sea was not connected to the high seas, which was the reason as to why 
Slovenia was granted a maritime junction across the territorial sea of Croatia.375 Whether or 
not a similar solution could be applicable in the dispute between BiH and Croatia is debatable. 
In other words, that BiH would be granted a maritime junction from its territorial waters to 
the high seas, across the internal and territorial seas of Croatia. One major problem is that BiH 
waters are located deep within the internal waters of Croatia. A junction would have to be 
geographically long in distance, in comparison with the Slovenian maritime junction. It shall 
also be said that case law concerning maritime corridors is rather sparse, but it is possible to 
assume that the outcome of the PCA 2007 Arbitration Award could have significant impact 
on legal developments in and around Neum.   
 
To add further confusion, according to Croatia, the straits located between the territorial sea 
of BiH and the high seas, hold the status of international straits.376 The legal regime in 
international straits is as such that vessels of a foreign State may pass through it, since they 
enjoy the right of ’non-suspendable passage’377. Thus, if a vessel is en route to or from Neum, 
BiH, they would be able to use the Croatian straits for international navigation. It shall be 
mentioned that this has been the de facto regime in this part of the Adriatic Sea. However, the 
question that remains is if BiH should be content with this solution, since it has more or less 
turned into State practice of both States, or if BiH should opt for a junction, similar to the one 
Slovenia gained in the PCA Arbitration. BiH may demand a junction, and in light of 
mentioned case law, it could potentially acquire one. However, Croatia would most likely 
oppose the move, equally as it has done in the northern Adriatic Sea, in order to be consistent 
with its State practice. Nonetheless, if BiH would be granted a maritime junction to the high 
seas, it would be plausible that such reasoning could become a part of customary law.  
 
It is possible to put this specific question into an EU perspective. Croatia is a member of the 
Union, whereas BiH is not. In the hypothetical scenario where BiH would potentially be 
subject to EU sanctions, it would have implications for this State. Croatian internal waters are, 
equally, the internal waters of the EU. Therefore, sanctions against BiH would result in a 
situation where BiH vessels and persons would not be able to pass through Croatian maritime 
spaces, no matter what political views Croatia would hold. It shall be said that there are 
currently no such plans from the EU, but it is one concern that the political leaders of BiH 
would have to bear in mind in future negotiations with Croatia.   
 
5.2.4   International Arbitration  
Under what circumstances the dispute will be resolved and settled is an important part of the 
overall issue. An international arbitration, similar to the Slovenia/Croatia Arbitration, could 
                                                
375 See ‘Appendix 2’.  
376 Section 2.3.5, ‘Peljesac Bridge’; Šabić, Borić, (n 5) 5. 
377 TSC 1958 article 16(4); UNCLOS 1982 article 45(1)(b); ’Corfu Channel Case’ (UK v. Albania) (Judgement) 
[1949] ICJ Rep. 	
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be one solution. However, it shall be noted that an international arbitration would require the 
consent of both States, which is easier said than done. The first arbitration did not result in a 
positive outcome for Croatia, whereas BiH would most likely be very successful in its claims. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the State structure of BiH. After the independence 
war in BiH, political power was divided by the three ethnic groups within the country. 
Representatives of the three major ethnic groups (legally referred to as ‘constituent peoples’) 
would have to give their consent and approval in order for the dispute to be settled in an 
international arbitration. Currently, political representatives of the Croats in BiH hold close 
relations to Croatia. Due to this, it is hard to project that BiH would be able to officially bring 
the matter to arbitration. Moreover, the fact that the dispute has been on-going for decades, it 
seems as if neither State would opt for such proceedings378. Another and more plausible 
settlement could be reached through a bilateral agreement. The most provisions of the 1999 
Neum Agreement, despite that it has not been ratified, has constituted modus vivendi and has 
been followed by both States. It is possible that the two States could renegotiate the 
agreement in a direction which would resolve the remaining issues. A bilateral agreement 
could perhaps be a better solution, since it would allow the States to compromise and agree to 
a settlement which would be in the interest of both neighbours.  
 
5.2.5   Answer to the second research question  
The 1999 Neum Agreement, which aimed to resolve the maritime dispute between the two 
States has never been ratified. It is not possible to see any indications that so will be the case 
in a foreseeable future, at least not in its current form, since the parliaments of both States 
oppose such a move. However, the provisions of the agreement has more or less become 
modus vivendi and is largely respected by both States, to the extent that it can be seen as State 
practice. Furthermore, the construction of the Croatian Peljesac Bridge has given the dispute 
another dimension. Croatia seems to be in breach of treaty law, since its internal waters are 
currently cutting off the territorial sea of BiH from the high seas. It remains unclear if the 
bridge is being constructed over Croatian or BiH maritime territory. Available case law does 
speak in favour of BiH, since its territorial waters could be, through natural prolongation, 
extended. Thus, the rights of BiH as a coastal State can today be viewed as violated by 
Croatia. The core issue is the fact that the maritime border between the two States has 
remained unsettled and it is not possible to say where the border geographically runs. 
Whether or not this is a reason to stop the construction of the bridge depends on who is asked 
the question. Croatia argues that the border has been settled through State practice, since the 
Neum Agreement is largely implemented, whereas BiH argues that the border cannot be 
considered as settled since the agreement has never been ratified. The concerns of BiH should 
not be waved so simply, since previous treaty and case law could benefit BiH more than 
Croatia. Furthermore, since the agreement itself is not ratified, there are no guarantees that the 
projected border is in line with international maritime law.  
 
                                                
378 View shared by Dr Robin Cleverly [E-mail], Director, Marbdy Consulting Ltd (Somerset, UK, 21 November 
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Nevertheless, the construction of the bridge itself should be regarded as an infrastructural 
project. Its current size characteristics with a height of 55 m, which have partly been changed 
due to objections from BiH, would still allow relatively large vessels to pass under it en route 
to Neum. The prospects of any harbour construction Neum are slim, and BiH will remain 
dependent of the Croatian harbour in Ploce for a significant amount of time.  
 
5.3   Should the maritime border between Croatia and Montenegro, in the proximity of 
the Bay of Kotor, be drawn in accordance with the principle of equidistance or the 
principle of equity? 
In order to answer the third and last research question, it is important to understand the 
current legal regime taking place in the proximity of the Bay of Kotor. In 2002, the 
‘Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)’ was signed by the governments of the two neighbours. As the 
name states, it is only meant to be temporary, until both parties reach a new agreement which 
would resolve the dispute. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the provisions of 
the temporary agreement have been largely implemented. Also, the current bilateral relations 
between the two States are considered as good. Both are members of NATO. Hence, the 
already co-operate in security issues.  
 
5.3.1   Who owns the Prevlaka Peninsula? 
The Prevlaka Peninsula is a very narrow land strip which, according to the temporary 
protocol, falls within the boundaries of the Republic of Croatia. It is located at the north-
western entrance of the Bay of Kotor.379 Due to the principle ‘land dominates the sea’, the 
peninsula produces Croatian territorial sea at the entrance itself. During the rule of the SFRY, 
this was a none-issue. However, post-independence of both States, the question as to what 
legal status the peninsula hold is up for debate. In the temporary protocol, it is only mentioned 
that the peninsula would temporarily be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of Croatia380.  
 
The current modus vivendi, concerning the peninsula has left Montenegro largely displeased, 
since the entrance of the bay is shared between the two States. The question is if the current 
legal regime is in line with the Badinter Commission’s report381. The peninsula itself was a 
part of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia prior to independence and as the land borders 
were to remain the same post-independence, it could be said that the temporary protocol is not 
in line with the Commission’s report.  
 
During future negotiations, the issue concerning the ownership of the peninsula will have to 
be discussed. Thus, it may be said that Prevlaka Peninsula legal status is currently unclear, 
and neither State can officially say that they hold undivided sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
the land. However, it is hard to ignore the fact that the peninsula has been a part of Croatia 
consistently both prior and after independence (although ‘temporarily’). On the other hand, 
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Montenegro will find it hard to put claims on the peninsula, since both States have remained 
consistent with the Badinter Commission Report from 1991. Furthermore, the principle of Uti 
possidetis382, which has had significant influence over other disputes between the ex-
Yugoslav State, would also speak in favour of Croatia. The fact that the peninsula was 
demilitarised and under UN control in the period between 1992-2002 does not change the 
circumstances to an extent that it will be tenable to see the peninsula be transferred under the 
control of Montenegro.  
 
5.3.2   The Legal Regime at the Entrance of the Bay of Kotor  
According to the Temporary Protocol, regarding the legal regime over waters that surround 
the peninsula, and ultimately the entrance of the bay, is shared between the two States. Joint 
controls are enforced and it is possible to say that an informal condominium has been in force 
since 2002 in the area. The maritime border has its starting-point of the western coast of the 
bay. This is also the main issue for Montenegro, since the State claims complete control over 
the entrance. On the other hand, Croatia claims that the bay should partly be considered as 
theirs.383 
 
Croatia is right in the sense that their control of the peninsula produces territorial sea over 
which it holds sovereignty, and it is in line with UNCLOS. Be that as it may, it is important to 
look at the wider picture in the area. Montenegro holds over 100 km of coast within the bay, a 
significant proportion of its population resides here and there are several Montenegrin 
harbours within it. Practically all vessels passing through the entrance are en route to or from 
a Montenegrin harbour. The dispute holds similarities with the Slovenian/Croatian dispute in 
the Bay of Piran384, where Croatia was in a disadvantaged position, since the bay was found 
by the PCA to be of greater economic, security and navigational importance to Slovenia.  
 
The temporary delimitation at the entrance has been done in accordance with the principle of 
equidistance, article 15(1), UNCLOS. The fact that Croatia and Montenegro hold land 
territory adjacent to the waters that flow through the entrance of the bay, generate territorial 
sea for both States. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the temporary delimitation is in 
line with UNCLOS and international maritime law in general. However, in any bilateral 
negotiations or international arbitration concerning a final delimitation, the question of 
‘special circumstances’ will have to be raised. As mentioned, Montenegro opposes the present 
solution, and the State wants to see it revised. Depending on what claims Montenegro will 
present in a future negotiation or even an arbitrational tribunal, a change of the provisional 
equidistance line currently in place, could be legally made.  
 
Under article 15(2), UNCLOS, a State can present relevant/special circumstances, which 
would allow a change of a provisional delimitation. As stated above, Montenegro holds major 
interests in the bay that may be considered to be of national importance. Croatia will find it 
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hard to make any convincing claims within the bay itself. However, any claim for territorial 
sea at the entrance of the bay will have to be respected by Montenegro. The coastal 
configuration of both States in the area are such, that it allows both to hold some type of 
maritime control at the entrance itself. Hence, it is important to differentiate (1) the maritime 
border and (2) the legal regime at the entrance of the bay. Changes to the border can 
geographically only be done by moving it closer to the coast to Croatia, since the ratio of 
coastal lengths of the two States are in favour of Montenegro. However, changing the border 
from what was agreed in the temporary protocol would mean that the Prevlaka Peninsula 
would not produce any territorial sea for Croatia whatsoever385. Therefore, any further 
changes of the border in the direction of Croatian land territory should not be seen as viable. 
As for the legal regime, it shall be said that Montenegro has historically cited security and 
navigational concerns, as to why Croatia cannot hold half the entrance. However, the 
geopolitical situation has changed in the region, since both States view each other as good 
neighbours and both are members of NATO. The fact that the two were at war during the 
1990s and that the bilateral relations were damaged by the turn of the century, cannot be 
considered as a relevant circumstance in the present context.  
  
Moreover, in the territorial sea of a State, foreign vessels enjoy the right of innocent 
passage.386 Since the Montenegrin harbours are located inside the bay, to which almost all 
vessels are bound to and from, it would still be able to navigate in and out of the bay due to 
the principle. Nonetheless, as one of two coastal States, Croatia would still have the right to 
enforce its jurisdiction and sovereignty at the entrance. Vessels would also have to comply 
with Croatian regulations.  
 
One possible outcome in future negotiations between the two States, could include a clause 
where authorities of both States jointly exercise control over the entrance of the bay. Frankly, 
according to the Temporary Protocol, this is the official legal regime and it has operated as 
modus vivendi from 2002 and onwards. It is difficult to expect that Croatia will make 
concessions and grant unrestricted access at the entrance of the bay, even though practically 
all vessels passing are en route to or from Montenegro. There are two major reasons for this. 
Firstly, Croatian land territory is located right next to the entrance, and Croatia will want to 
uphold security and sovereignty over its maritime territory. Secondly, changing the 
provisional equidistance line would not benefit Croatia, since the line would be drawn too 
close to its land territory, which would generate less territorial sea than it already has in the 
area.  
 
5.3.3   Delimitation of the Territorial Sea  
As for the delimitation of the territorial sea in the Adriatic between Croatia and Montenegro, 
it shall be said that a provisional equidistance line was agreed in the Temporary Protocol, in 
accordance with article 15(1), UNCLOS. The line is measured from the Prevlaka Peninsula 
and the entrance of the Bay of Piran, stretching out into the Adriatic. Montenegro disputes the 
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temporary maritime border, since it claims that a delimitation should be made in accordance 
with the principle of equity. However, even if Montenegro waited a decade to officially 
present its maritime claims over the territorial sea, it finally did so in 2014387. This move was 
viewed by Croatia as a breach of the 2002 Temporary Protocol, resulting in a diplomatic 
protest note being sent to the Montenegrin government.388 Currently, the two States have 
over-lapping claims over a maritime area of roughly 1892 km2.389 On the other hand, the 
Government of Montenegro protested in 2015, when Croatia proposed to explore and exploit 
within the disputed area for oil and gas minerals390.  
 
In general, maritime border delimitations are first made in accordance with the principle of 
equidistance.391 As for Montenegro, it is understandable that they oppose such a delimitation, 
since it cuts through its coastal front out in the Adriatic due to the geographical position of the 
Prevlaka Peninsula, which grants Croatia a significantly larger maritime area. The peninsula 
is very narrow and relatively small, but according to the Temporary Protocol from 2002, it is 
the starting-point from where the maritime delimitation border is being drawn. It is 
questionable if an international court would accept this as a final solution, since it does not 
provide a proportional delimitation. Again, comparisons can be made with the PCA 2017 
Slovenia/Croatia Case, where the tribunal concluded that Croatia’s coastal configuration is 
generally south-westwards. But in the Bay of Piran, Croatia’s coast turns drastically north-
east. The application of a strict equidistance line generated a disproportionate amount of 
maritime area for Croatia, due to a very small coastal strip.392 The same reasoning could be 
applicable in the proximity of the Prevlaka Peninsula, which ultimately will affect the 
delimitation of their respective territorial seas.  
  
It is clear that both States officially have overlapping maritime claims to the territorial sea 
since 2014. One question which arises is what the underlying reasons of these recent 
decisions are. It is well-known that States involved in maritime disputes often tend to 
exaggerate their claims in order to have a better starting position when involved in 
international arbitrations. For example, Slovenia did claim sovereignty over the whole Bay of 
Piran, despite the fact that it was clearly against existing treaty law. It is speculative, but it 
seems to be a reasonable explanation, since the claim of Montenegro is also unseen of in 
previous case law. As for the actions of Croatia and the legality to explore and exploit the 
disputed area, the question will remain unanswered. Nevertheless, the area in which both 
States have overlapping claims is indeed rich in oil and natural resources. It is possible that 
the reason as to why Croatia decided to make this move is because it might want to claim 
economic factors as a special circumstance. Even though this claim is hypothetical, it is not 
unheard off in the context of international maritime law. A State may claim relevant and/or 
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special circumstances, which can result in a change of the provisional equidistance line.393 
Similarities can be found in the 2002 ICJ ‘Cameroon/Nigeria Case’394. However, the ICJ 
concluded that the Nigerian oil concessions could not pose as a relevant circumstance. Thus, 
Croatia will most likely not be successful in this specific claim. Besides, Croatia would in any 
case be likely to remain consistent in its claim that the principle of equidistance should be 
used also in the question of delimiting the border between the territorial seas of the two 
States. On that note, both aspects should largely be viewed as a part of a wider political game, 
but it does change the dimension of the dispute. 
 
In conclusion, it is obvious that the geographically south-eastern position of the peninsula 
generates a disproportionate amount of maritime area for Croatia. Thus, it is plausible that 
Montenegro would be successful in its claim that the border delimitation should be made in 
accordance with the principle of equity, with changes to the provisional line currently in 
place, since it would result in a more balanced and proportional delimitation.  
 
5.3.4   International Arbitration 
The possibilities for the two States to bring the dispute to an international arbitration, to which 
both parties must give its consent remains unlikely. Mainly, the Government of Croatia does 
not seem to be positively set for an arbitration395. It goes hand in hand with the outcome of the 
Slovenian/Croatian Arbitration, which Croatia does not accept. Same reason lies behind 
Croatia’s unwillingness to resolve the dispute with BiH at an arbitration tribunal396. As for the 
provisions of the Temporary Protocol between Croatia and Montenegro, they will continue to 
be applied as a temporary legal regime since it has proved to maintain the security in the area. 
A future bilateral agreement between the two States could solve most of the legal issues 
concerning the delimitation of both the land and maritime border. It will most certainly be 
based on the current Temporary Protocol, but with adjustments, in line with the present 
security situation at Croatia’s southern border. A bilateral agreement would be a better option, 
since it would allow the neighbours to compromise and agree to a settlement which would be 
in the interest of the both.  
 
5.3.5   Answer to the third research question 
The provisions of the ‘Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’ have been largely implemented by both 
States since 2002. It has become State practice of the neighbours and modus vivendi. The 
implementation of the protocol has transformed a turbulent area into a clam and peaceful one. 
Nonetheless, it has outplayed its role, since both States are discontent with the current 
situation, for a variety of reasons. At some point in the future, the dispute will have to be 
addressed and resolved jointly by both States. As for the research question, it must be seen in 
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the context of the entirety of the dispute, since it does not only involve the entrance of the Bay 
of Kotor, but also the delimitation of the territorial sea between the two States.  
 
Due to the consistent State practice of Croatia concerning the territorial sovereignty over the 
Prevlaka Peninsula, over which it has held de facto control since 2002, Montenegro will have 
to accept that the peninsula will de jure become a part of Croatia. In turn, this will have 
negative consequences for Montenegro, since the principle ‘land dominates the sea’ is a well-
established principle within the field of international maritime law. Thus, the north-western 
part of the entrance of the Bay of Kotor will fall under Croatian territorial waters. 
Nevertheless, the legal regime and framework at the entrance should be negotiated in the 
spirit of good neighbourly relations, since the bay is of great economic and navigational 
interest for Montenegro. The current sea-lanes established at the entrance are well-
functioning, despite the fact that they are divided between the two States.  
 
As for the delimitation of the territorial sea, Croatia maintains its position that it has had in the 
two previous disputes, i.e. the principle of equidistance should delimit the border. Frankly, a 
strict application of the principle would benefit Croatia the most. Furthermore, the disregard 
of Croatia concerning relevant and special circumstances (perhaps apart from the economic 
interests it holds in the disputed area), might prove to have negative consequences for Croatia, 
as it did in the Slovenia/Croatia dispute. Montenegro, on the other hand, could be successful 
in claiming that the principle of equidistance would result in a disproportionate divide of the 
territorial sea. Hence, in accordance with previous case law, there are convincing reasons for 
the temporary equidistance line to be adjusted in a more equitable manner.  
 
6   Conclusion  
The eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea has been the scene of decades-long maritime border 
disputes. The drastic and complex collapse of the SFRY left many border disputes and legal 
questions unanswered. The successor and new-neighbour States found themselves in broken-
down bilateral relations with each other, which resulted in long overdue disputes with no 
solutions in sight. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to solve the disputes through 
diplomatic channels. Agreements were signed, but they failed to be ratified by the State 
parliaments. A peculiarity is that most provisions of the agreements have been implemented 
in each specific dispute. Hence, the current modus vivendi is largely based on what former 
governments of each State has agreed upon. Croatia is the State with the highest number of 
border disputes, of which three concerns the maritime borders with its neighbours. The only 
dispute that was resolved through an international arbitration was with Slovenia. However, 
Croatia has refused to accept the final judgement in this specific case. The disputes with BiH 
and Montenegro remain to be sensitive issues for the current and future relations between 
these States. As of today, it is not possible to see any political will to resolve the disputes. 
Hence, negotiations are put on hold for the time being.  
 
Equally as the disputes are complex, so are the legal tools within the field of international 
maritime law. The principles and provisions of international treaties, e.g. UNCLOS, are 
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formulated to have general application. However, every dispute is unique and holds 
characteristics that are different from any other dispute. When analysing a maritime border 
dispute, States often disagree on several aspects, which often are complex. Furthermore, it is 
not just a border that needs to be agreed upon, but also the legal regimes in specific areas and 
questions concerning State sovereignty and jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is possible to see 
consistency in the State practises of each State. Croatia has generally argued that the principle 
of equidistance should be used for final delimitations in all disputes. This should not be seen 
as unusual, since the principle benefits Croatia’s claims the most.  Furthermore, the principle 
is a well-established and legitimate tool for delimitations, but it is not the only one. In general, 
previous case law concerning maritime border delimitations show a variety of special and 
relevant circumstances that need to be taken into account, before reaching a final solution. 
Croatia has consistently opposed any claim of its neighbours, which have largely been based 
on special and relevant circumstances.  
 
The analysis shows that there is a risk that the Western Balkan States could potentially be 
regarded by other States as unreliable partners in the context of international law, since their 
bilateral agreements have failed to be ratified. Nevertheless, the BiH/Croatia- and 
Montenegro/Croatia dispute will most likely have to be resolved through additional and future 
bilateral negotiations, due to Croatia’s current negative opinion concerning international 
arbitrations. The modus vivendi in the disputed areas are already largely based on previous 
agreements. Hence, the most optimal solutions would have to be based on the 1999 Neum 
Agreement and the 2002 Temporary Protocol with modifications in line with the interests of 
each State.  
 
As for the Slovenian/Croatian dispute, the legal regime in the Bay of Piran is already based on 
the 2017 Final Award of the PCA. In general, the outcome for Croatia was negative, but not 
in an extreme manner. The maritime junction which Slovenia was granted is a precedent in 
case law within the legal field of international maritime law. Nevertheless, Croatia still holds 
full sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territorial sea and Slovenia did not gain any 
additional rights apart from having the right to pass undisrupted through Croatian waters. 
Hence, the solution is closely linked with the principle of innocent passage. The analysis 
found that the Final Award is not entirely uncontroversial, due to the reasoning concerning 
the natural prolongation of the territorial sea for Slovenia. The concept of natural prolongation 
has in previous case law only been applied in cases concerning delimitations of the 
continental shelf. As for the Bay of Piran, even though it was not divided according to the 
principle of equidistance, Croatia still gained the southern proportion of the bay, despite not 
having any significant interests in the area. Croatia will either have to accept the judgement at 
some point in the future or persuade Slovenia to enter bilateral negotiations in order to solve 
the remaining issues it faces. Currently, what seems to be the main question concerns the 
small fishing communities on both sides of the border and it would be appropriate to establish 
a clear legal framework as to how these activities shall be conducted. However, any further 
changes to the maritime border within the bay should be deemed as unlikely, since it would 
mean that Slovenia would give up maritime spaces it was granted by an international court. In 
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turn, that would be seen as a precedent and could negatively affect the international view of 
the PCA as a maritime settlement mechanism.  
 
As for the BiH/Croatian dispute, the analysis has shown that the construction of the Peljesac 
Bridge and Croatia’s use of straight baselines are not in line with UNCLOS, since the 
territorial sea of BiH is cut-off from the high seas. Nevertheless, it is largely a question 
concerning the freedom of navigation for the BiH side, which Croatia has never opposed. 
Vessels are still able to enter and exit Neum, BiH, through the internal waters of Croatia, 
despite the fact that innocent passage does not have to be tolerated in internal waters of a 
State. However, the chances of bringing the dispute to an international arbitration should be 
seen as very small. The reason for this lies partly in the power share within the State of BiH, 
which is divided along ethnic lines and consent from all three ethnic groups would be 
required. Such move is currently unlikely. On the other side, Croatia is also sceptical of 
entering a second arbitration, primarily due to large costs and negative experience from the 
Slovenian/Croatian arbitration. The most viable solution would be through a bilateral 
agreement, which would be largely based on the 1999 Neum Agreement. Croatia would have 
to change its use of baselines in the Channel of Mali Ston and in the Croatian Straits, in order 
to be in line with UNCLOS, to which both States are party to. Furthermore, a future 
agreement will also have to permanently delimit the maritime border under the Peljesac 
Bridge itself, since the outcome of the PCA 2017 Slovenia/Croatia Arbitration show that the 
concept of natural prolongation also can be applied in the case of territorial waters. As for the 
bridge itself, it shall be said that Croatia has the right to connect its two parts of land territory, 
but the characteristics of the bridge must be as such that it does not hinder or prevent vessels 
from entering the territorial sea of BiH from international waters.  
 
Lastly, the maritime border dispute between Montenegro and Croatia is on-going, but the 
provisions of the Temporary Protocol from 2002, concerning the legal regime at the entrance 
of the Bay of Kotor and the provisional delimitation of the territorial seas, are implemented 
and respected by both States. Also, the protocol is the only agreement which is officially 
meant to be temporary when viewing the two other disputes that Croatia is involved in. The 
name of the protocol clearly states that the dispute will have to be resolved through a new 
agreement. Regarding the legal regime at the entrance of the bay, the analysis has shown that 
similarities can be found with the PCA 2017 Slovenia/Croatia dispute. The bay itself, with all 
its features within it, holds significant importance to Montenegro and this State will most 
likely remain firm in its claims to gain full control over the entrance of the bay. However, 
Croatia will argue that the Prevlaka Peninsula, which stretches out along the north-western 
part of the entrance, must generate territorial sea, which is also in line with UNCLOS. Croatia 
has the legal right to uphold its sovereignty both over the peninsula itself and over its 
maritime spaces, even if Montenegro has certain interests over the same. What remains is that 
the two States must create a framework that will regulate the legal regime at the entrance of 
the bay, so that Montenegro can have guarantees that Croatia will not at some point in the 
future hinder or prevent vessels from entering Montenegrin harbours within the bay. 
However, for the time being, it is reasonable to expect that Croatia will continue to allow 
innocent passage for vessels travelling in or out of the Bay of Kotor, since it would only harm 
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the generally good bilateral relations between the two States. As for the delimitation of the 
territorial sea between the two neighbours, it shall be said that there are overlapping claims 
since 2014, when Montenegro officially claimed a delimitation according to the principle of 
equidistance. However, the analysis has concluded that the act can only be seen as a political 
statement which is not in its entirety based on UNCLOS, to which both States are party to.  
 
The analysis has shown that any future bilateral agreement between the relevant States will 
have to address several issues. One can only speculate as to what the actual final solutions 
will be, but it shall be said that previous agreements have influenced and directed the disputes 
towards a final solution. Due to historic reasons, the States of South-Eastern Europe do view 
border disputes as rather politically sensitive questions. The reason as to why they have been 
on-going for several decades primarily lies in the absence of political will to reopen bilateral 
negotiations. Maritime border delimitations can easily be seen as hard nuts to crack for State 
politicians and leaders. But from a legal point of view, it shall be said all maritime border 
disputes are solvable in one way or another. Thanks to existing treaty law, case law and 
doctrine within the field of international maritime law, the analysis have shown a variety of 





















Blue: Original flow of the Dragonja River 
Light blue: The artificial canal of St. Odoric (which Croatia claims should constitute the 
border with Slovenia) 
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Dotted line: Maritime delimitation between the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republic of Croatia according to the Neum Agreement. 
 
Dashed Line: Maritime delimitation between the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republic of Croatia according to the Croatian Dubrovnik-Neretva County.  
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Translation (Cro. to Eng.) 
• ‘Hrvatska’  Croatia (The Republic of) 
• ‘Crna Gora’  Montenegro (The State of) 
• ‘Bokokotorska vrata’ Entrance of the Bay of Kotor  
 
Dashed Red Line: Temporary maritime border between Croatia and Montenegro according to 
the 2002 Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of 
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Translation (Cro. to Eng.) 
• ‘Hrvatska’  Croatia (The Republic of) 
• ‘Crna Gora’  Montenegro (The State of)  
 
Dashed Red Line: Temporary maritime border between Croatia and Montenegro according to 
article 4(5-6) the 2002 Temporary Protocol between Republic of Croatia and Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
 
Dashed Blue Line: Montenegro’s claimed border with Croatia (2011 and 2014). Currently, 
1892 km2 of maritime area is disputed.  
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